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ABSTRACT 
Public diplomacy – winning hearts and minds - is increasingly being recognized 
as integral to the fight against terrorism. Yet we know little about terrorist framing of 
their operations and its appeal. Is there a pattern in terrorist narratives that can be 
identified and countered? This thesis will examine how terrorist and insurgent 
movements frame their actions, delineating how these groups communicate with their 
public. Framing offers insights into terrorist and insurgent operations that are only 
recently being addressed but still not widely capitalized on by current U.S. Army 
operations in Iraq. My focus is on the role of framing in the U.S. counterterrorism effort, 
and I will demonstrate how insurgent and terrorist messages shape the information 
operations (IO) battlefield against U.S. and Coalition Forces in the Middle East. The 
thesis will show that the terrorist’s message is just as important as the act of terrorism 
itself and these messages provide a window into understanding their operations, their ties 
to constituencies, and possibly their direction for future attacks.  
The concept of framing can serve as an aid to U.S. military leaders in addressing 
problems that the conventional forces face when tasked to fight an unconventional but 
highly organized enemy. Framing’s application to military operations could help to better 
define the IO and PSYOP operations to maneuver commanders who are not as well 
versed in the use of non-kinetic offensive and defensive operations. Framing, as defined 
by social mobilization theorists offers a different perspective on the operational structure 
of insurgent leadership and can demonstrate weaknesses in the insurgent organization 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Public diplomacy – winning hearts and minds – is increasingly being recognized 
as integral to the fight against terrorism. Yet we know little about terrorist framing of 
their operations and its appeal. Is there a pattern in terrorist narratives that can be 
identified and countered? This thesis will examine how terrorist movements frame their 
actions, delineating how these groups communicate with their public. Framing offers 
insights into insurgent and terrorist operations that are only recently being addressed but 
still not widely capitalized on by current U.S. Army operations in Iraq. Framing is 
directly associated with the information battlefield which encompasses media, deception, 
and the distribution of fliers that shape the battlefield through controlling the support of 
the civilian population. The focus is on the role of framing in the U.S. counterterrorism 
effort, and I will demonstrate how insurgent and terrorist messages shape the information 
operations (IO) battlefield against U.S. and Coalition Forces in the Middle East. The 
thesis will show that the terrorist’s message is just as important as the act of terrorism 
itself and these messages provide a window into understanding their operations, their ties 
to constituencies, and possibly their direction for future attacks. The concept of framing 
can serve as an aid to U.S. military leaders in addressing problems that the conventional 
forces face when tasked to fight an unconventional but highly organized enemy.  
 In politically motivated violence or a terrorist attack, the action of attacking is a 
billboard exclaiming the resolve and capacity of the organization. After the attack, the 
organization must garner support for its actions and evade the retaliation of its targeted 
political opponent while simultaneously appearing to its constituents as a symbol of 
social justice. Information and messages of such a critical use cannot be haphazardly 
created without close scrutiny of the target audience. Terrorism is a strategy utilized by 
rational actors;1 it is a method of attacking an enemy that is conventionally superior to 
the terrorists’ own forces by attacking the civilian population, and/or their property, in an 
attempt to gain a political, religious, or ideological objective desirable to the terrorist 
                                                 
1 R.A. Pape. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review, vol. 97, 
343-361, 2003. 
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organization.2  Della Porta, Tilly, Hafez, Wiktorowitcz, and other social theorists have 
argued quite convincingly that the decision to use subversive violence is not always a 
foregone conclusion; often it is a response to continued exclusion from the greater power, 
i.e., the targeted political entity.  These theorists’ work approaches the importance of 
framing to terrorist acts but fails to address and exploit the application of framing to 
counterterrorism/counterinsurgency operations fully. The purpose of the terrorist attack is 
rooted in the group’s ideology3 and the message is how the group meshes their actions to 
their political goals. Framing is how the terrorist group guards their important message 
from refutation by the opposition and how the group creates fear in the target and support 
from their constituency.  
Frames or messages from terrorist or insurgent groups directly affect U.S., 
Coalition Forces, and allied nations in the Middle East as well as the effectiveness of the 
Global War on Terror (GWOT) by altering the information battlefield and currying 
support from the local populations against occupying or security forces. 
A. IMPORTANCE OF THIS STUDY  
  U.S. military officers have identified the need to adapt a conventional force to 
fighting terrorists and insurgents. GEN (Ret.) Krulak4 (former commandant of the Marine 
Corps) and LTC Nagl5 (US Army) have taken great strides in preparing their respective 
branches of services in the counterterrorism/counterinsurgency fight; both of these 
officers have highlighted the overemphasis of conventional tactics in the combat training 
of their branches versus the cultural-centric training needed to conduct counterterrorism 
and counterinsurgency operations that are the current mission for U.S. military 
operations.  
                                                 
2 Title 22 United States Code, Section 2656f(d) 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/index.cfm?docid=2419. Accessed 10 OCT 2007. 
3 C.J.M. Drake, “The Role of Ideology in Terrorists’ Target Selection,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence, vol. 10, 53-85, 1998. 
4 Charles C. Krulak. "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War." Marines Magazine, 
January 1999 URL: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm. Accessed 05 AUG 
2007. 
5 John A. Nagl,. Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife. University of Chicago Press; Chicago (2002). 
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 Current operations have taken a turn towards “effects based” operations; and a 
key element in these operations is the information operations fight. Effects-based 
operations include lethal indirect fires as well as non-lethal measures to shape the 
maneuver commander’s battle-space.6 As operations in Iraq continue to focus on stability 
and support, the use of lethal fires has slackened and more emphasis has been placed on 
integrating Iraqi forces and gaining popular support for the fledgling Iraqi government. 
This paper is meant to explore terrorist framing as an effective form of control of the 
information battlefield utilized by the forces in opposition to the U.S. and Coalition 
Forces in order to better understand the complex information environment that U.S. 
policy makers are currently operating in the Middle East. Counter-Information operations 
have been an up-hill battle for the conventional forces in Iraq due to the social, cultural, 
and language barriers between American soldiers and Marines and the indigenous Arab, 
Persian, Turk, and Kurdish population. A popular saying among soldiers is that 
“everything is information-operations (IO),”7 this organizational frustration is not 
combating the flow of terrorist information nor is it constructing a tactical use of IO that 
would separate it from the rules of engagement (ROE). A more clear understanding of the 
terrorist message may yield a more effective response by the U.S. forces in theatre.  
 Key to the terrorist operations is the ability to deny the occupying force the ability 
to converse with the general population while turning or maintaining its levels of support 
from the public opinion in the theatre of operations against the occupying forces and their 
sponsored indigenous auxiliaries and security forces. The concept of framing best 
explains this operation’s measure of effect and implementation. Through defining the 
Islamist, sectarian, terrorist and regional political frames a better understanding of how to 
counter these frames may gain more legitimacy for the Coalition Forces attempting to 
stabilize Iraq and may garner more support for the Iraqi government. 
 As a culture, organization and a political entity, the U.S. military tends to spend 
time and energy focusing on the actual terrorist act, analyzing the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the 
                                                 
6 Allen W. Batschelet. “Effects-Based Operations For Joint Warfighters” Us Army Professional 
Writing Collection May-June 2003 
.http://www.Army.Mil/Prof_Writing/Volumes/Volume1/June_2003/6_03_3.html. Accessed 05 AUG 2007. 
7 Joseph F. Paschall, LTC,  U.S.MC. “IO for Joe: Applying Strategic IO at the Tactical Level,” Redleg 
Journal. July-August 2005.  26. 
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act, but not as much emphasis is placed on the message nor on the subsequent fuel that 
American policy makes for the opposition. This ‘tunnel vision’ is necessary in the 
immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack, when actions are most threatening, but in a 
stability and support operation such as the operations currently going on in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the necessity to out-think the opponent is arguably as important as the 
ability to act. What are the complaints and positions of the opposition and how do they 
use framing to secure their own power-base against a large and threatening opponent like 
the U.S.?  Moreover, how can the opposition turn the people who have a good chance to 
profit on U.S. policies in Iraq?  Framing can create a national idea, turn a political or 
economic issue into a fight to preserve religious values, and vilify an opponent to the 
point of political impotence. Such a powerful tool for social mobilization plays a major 
role in creating a stable environment, or disrupting it.  
 Ron Schleifer’s book, Psychological Warfare in the Intifada8, analyzes the 
political messages contained in the psychological warfare of both the Israeli military and 
Palestinian opposition as a part of the overall strategy of either side in the Intifada. His 
work is unique in that he contrasts the military strategy that the Palestinians used, that 
closely resembles the strategy used by Iraqi insurgents, with the dominant military force 
of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), which closely resembles the U.S. and Coalition 
Forces in Iraq. Using Schleifer’s model, I argue that understanding the opposing frames 
from the prominent groups in the region is essential to the American mission success in 
Iraq. The economic and military power of the U.S. cannot match the innate legitimacy of 
regional leaders and politically significant parties such as SCIRI, Iran, Hezbollah, Al-
Qaeda, etc. Each of these parties is based on Islamist ideology that uses religion as a way 
to create resonance within their constituent populations. Without addressing the frames of 
the opposition, our silence creates a greater space for their legitimacy.  
B. HOW FRAMING APPLIES TO U.S. OPERATIONS 
 Islamist leaders utilize their popular support, charisma, long-standing 
relationships with locals and their intimate knowledge of the human terrain to frame their 
                                                 
8 Ron Schleifer. Psychological Warfare in the Intifada: Israeli and Palestinian Media Politics and 
Military Strategies. Sussex Press; Portland. (2006). 
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attacks on Coalition Forces (CF). Current Information Operations (IO) are learning, 
growing and adapting to the situation, but it is an intrinsically slow process hindered by 
the size and diversity of the U.S. armed forces as an organization and the alien nature of 
Arab culture to American culture. For all the innovations and technological advances that 
the U.S. is accomplishing in Iraq, the opponent still maintains the ‘high ground’ for 
information out-put and information reception. Their operations include mass media via 
television and radio stations and especially the internet. As Psychological Operations 
(PSYOP) officers have found, the U.S. has only scratched the surface of the effects that 
can be gained by information denial and delivery via the internet.9  Islamist leaders take 
great advantage of the media channels to garner support for their cause and it is a channel 
largely yielded by the U.S. 
 In a “war among the people,”10 such as an insurgency, the populace is the “center 
of gravity”11 for operations. As Frank Kitson argued, the "main characteristic that 
distinguishes campaigns of insurgency from other forms of war is that they are primarily 
concerned with the struggle for men's minds."12  As such, the populace is the key terrain 
to be gained as an end unto themselves, not as a means to some other ends. Framing is the 
tool that leaders on both sides of the political/security spectrum seek to utilize in order to 
obtain this key terrain.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to apply framing to military operations, an understanding of the literature 
defining framing and the military doctrine that must apply it is necessary. Little prior 
work exists on the connection of framing to IO specifically or to counterterrorism in 
general. Typically, the military writes its manuals in a functional methodology, taking 
academic work as a basis for writing but not writing as a continuation of academic work 
                                                 
9 Interview by author with MAJ Brian Yarbrough, Commander C Company, 5th POB (PSYOP 
Battalion) stationed in Al Anbar, Iraq (2006-07) 19 NOV 07 by author. 
10 Rupert Smith. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. Alfred A. Knopf, New 
York. (2007)  xiii.  
11 Carl Von Clausewitz. On War. Penguin; New York. (1982). 
12 Frank Kitson. Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping (New York: 
Stackpole, 1971),  290 as quoted by Andrew Garfield in “The  U.S. Counter-Propaganda Failure in Iraq” 
ME Quarterly. volume XIV: number 4, Fall 2007.   
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in itself. Utilizing social mobilization theories such as framing to analyze military 
operations is a rich field in academia, but not so much with the U.S. military. The 
literature that will be used in this thesis will therefore fall into three categories according 
to the source of information: academic, military, and journalistic. In this section a 
discussion of the academic literature sources will come first, military second, and 
journalistic last. Literature considered academic is from purely academic sources, for 
example, Charles Tilly and David Snow. Military literature will encompass all Army 
field manuals, Joint Publications, generals’/soldiers’ memoirs, officers’ professional 
forum websites (www.companycommand.com) and commentaries and intelligence 
sources (unclassified) that deal with the application of information operations within 
counterterrorism operations in the Middle East. Journalistic sources include all primary 
sources other than military sources, statements of political actors as they are recorded by 
different news sources, and print/media sources representing these actors. 
1. Academic Sources 
 Scholarly work on the social mobilization concept of framing can be separated 
into theory and application. The theorists in social mobilization create the ideas and 
standards that constitute the concept of framing and, for example, apply the concept on 
selected societies and regions based on their particular region of interest. The scholarly 
work focused on application cited in this thesis will be concerned only with the Middle 
East and North Africa and will be primarily focused on political parties showing a 
proclivity to utilize terror as a tactic and how they use framing to justify to and gain 
social momentum from the use of this tactic in their constituency. 
 Academic research in social mobilization originally focused on the ideology of 
the leaders and key historical figures with little to no coverage on the contexts and culture 
of the time and place where the social movements happened. Quantitative methodologies 
such as resource mobilization and political processes took the lead in social mobilization 
until the late 1970s and 80s when ideology and culture were opened to scholarly 
analysis.13  The new approach to social movements asserts that these movements exist in 
                                                 
13 Mayer N Zald. “Culture, ideology and strategic framing” in Mc Adam, et. al. (eds.). Comparative 
Perspectives on Social Movements. Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, UK (1996)  262. 
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the greater milieu of social norms, cultural definitions, and context. As scholars grew to 
accept this perspective, the study of ideology and framing in social movements grew. 
 In studying any operation in Counterterrorism, the prominent and reoccurring 
opponents of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East are non-state actors that have shown 
the capacity to carry out terrorist activities are Islamist-led parties within Muslim 
countries. How Islamists frame their attacks on western and Israeli influence in the 
Middle East is central to this study, since their capacity to mobilize the society within 
their respective country is their direct line of supply for political power. Wiktorowitcz, in 
his work Islamic Activism, includes elements of framing relevant to Islamists in the 
Levant and Egypt. Hafez’ work Why Muslims Rebel, includes various case studies 
pertinent to the study of Islamist movements in North Africa and Egypt, which are widely 
accepted as the basis for Islamist social mobilization throughout the Muslim world. On 
Saudi Arabia, Gwenn Okruhlik has written on the frames that have resonance within the 
Saudi society based on her research within the country, speaking to leaders on multiple 
levels about the level of resistance to the government led by Islamists. Williams and 
Kubal have done much study on the idea of resonance of collective action frames within 
a society based on the center of gravity of the frames and their cultural repertoire; i.e., the 
frames must follow the cultural standards in order to speak to a wider audience, thus 
causing resonance within the society and thereby increasing the power of the collective 
action. Each of these authors presents a representation of cultural struggles within the 
Middle East that is more specific to the problems of framing and information operations 
that military manuals are able to detail.  
2. Military Sources 
 New data coming from the current Army operations has shifted the focus in 
professional literature towards understanding cultural implications as a part of combat 
operations.  John Nagl’s work Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife reflects this change and 
is the most recent and pertinent addition to the professional dialogue of military officers 
with experience in the counterinsurgency fight. He argues that the British in Malaya 
succeeded where the Americans in Vietnam failed because of the British Army’s ability 
to learn as an organization and apply a rich cultural understanding as well as a long 
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history of interaction in their area of operations than the Americans could claim in 
Vietnam. This study is done with respect to LTC Nagl’s personal experience in 
Khalidiya, Iraq within the Sunni Tri-angle, between Fallujah and Ramadi.  
 The increasing importance of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Civil 
Affairs (CA) is reflected in the 2006 Joint Publications Manual for Information 
Operations (IO), JP 3-13. In this publication, emphasis on integrating cultural norms into 
operations increases the likelihood of successful deception, stability and security 
operations, and psychological operations. The importance of this manual is that it has 
taken lessons learned by Soldiers and Marines in the field and created a doctrine whereby 
the continued operations can be improved. The U.S. military is learning that cultural 
knowledge is the key to defeating insurgents and terrorists with something other than 
bullets and guided munitions. 
 Finally, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)14 covers the most recent 
changes to U.S. Army doctrine and the issues that are currently affecting operations in 
Iraq. This website directly addresses the need for the U.S. Army to be a learning 
organization by collecting and analyzing data from operations. Specific data from 
operations has been classified, but the overall lessons learned about the importance of 
information operations and countering enemy framing is useful to this study.  
3. Journalistic Sources 
 These sources are predominantly on the websites from important printed and 
satellite/TV media. The importance of the media in framing is well documented by 
academic sources such as McAdams, Snow, and Schleifer. Arab leaders have used the 
media successfully in many campaigns to garner support from their constituents through 
frames that reached more people in less time through print, radio and satellite media. 
Media sources include al-Jazeera, CNN, BBC, the Saudi Gazette, al-Watan, al-Manar, the 
Palestinian Information Center (Hamas’ website), Israeli News: Arutz Sheva, and others. 
                                                 
14 “Mission” Center for Army Lessons Learned. www.call.army.mil. Accessed 20 OCT 07. 
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D. MAJOR QUESTIONS  
 The U.S. military’s former operations plan ran on conventional methods and 
sought only to limit the collateral damage to civilian populations, not necessarily to 
engage them as a “target” for ensuring stability such as PSYOP proposes and IO 
demands. The purpose of IO is to interrupt the enemy’s message to the population while 
strengthening friendly messages, thereby winning the hearts and minds of the population. 
I intend to show that framing can be more aptly applied to this operational fight and can 
help to organize military planners’ thought processes by identifying key steps that have to 
be made by the enemy in order to support his frames. These key steps can then be easily 
identified and interrupted by coalition forces. Thus the phenomenon of framing (by the 
enemy) can become the operation of counter-framing.  
 The major question concerning this study is whether or not framing can be 
applied to U.S. military operations which are characterized by a lack of intelligence about 
the civilian populations, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the military 
planners are only beginning to understand the culture and ideologies of the region. Is the 
insurgency in Iraq a social movement, or simply organized crime?  If it is organized 
crime, then the interaction with the population is strictly business or deception, if it is a 
social movement, then the concept of framing can be applied. Are frames borrowed from 
one region and used in another; for example, can the frames used by Hezbollah leaders in 
Lebanon be successful for Shi’i leaders in Iraq like Muqtada al-Sadr?  In other works, can 
resonance in one society be a platform for resonance in another?  Have U.S. Allies in the 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in the region (i.e., Israel) been able to use framing in 
their counterterrorism operations with Hamas and Hezbollah?   
E. THE GOAL OF THIS STUDY 
 This thesis seeks to capture the adaptation of the U.S. military to the 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight that it currently finds itself fighting. In 
fighting a counterinsurgency, or as General Rupert Smith termed it, a “war amongst the 
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people,”15 the U.S. military has had to associate itself with new forms of warfare that are 
more complicated, more nuanced than traditional conventional forces, at which the U.S. 
military excels. It is a true test of resilience for an organization to change not only tactics, 
but to abandon time-proven successful strategies to adapt to a new battlefield.  
 The application of the concept of framing to current operations deals directly with 
U.S. military “soft” power, its power to influence victory on the battlefield through the 
realization of U.S. foreign policy objectives. These operations fall under the 
specialization of U.S. Army Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Information 
Operations (IO) and it is in these branch specialties that the concept of framing is most 
readily applied.  
 This chapter serves as an introduction to the thesis and states the literature 
analyzed the importance of the study and the general goals of the thesis. Chapter II 
analyzes the current academic literature on framing and the corresponding literature 
utilized by the U.S. military in forming and supporting doctrine developed during the 
GWOT in order to align framing with U.S. military doctrine and tactics (focused on the 
land forces: U.S. Army and Marine Corps) and establish the pertinence of framing to U.S. 
military operations in Iraq. Chapter III is a study of Islamist uses of the Qur’an as a 
source for framing their actions and analyzes the early leaders of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, and Osama bin Laden. It analyzes the verses that are used by 
Islamists in respect to violent resistance and warfare in order to focus the thesis on what 
the current enemy is doing in Iraq by drawing on historical data from other movements. 
Chapter IV addresses the current U.S. military operations in Iraq, specifically Al Anbar 
Province and the gains in Information Operations (IO) that are being achieved through 
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and the integration of IO with conventional 
maneuver forces tasked with providing stability and support operations in the region. 
This chapter will address the frames used by the enemy (Al Qaeda in Iraq: AQI) and will 
rely on the information from Chapter III to make its argument. Chapter V is the 
 
                                                 
15 Rupert Smith. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. Alfred A Knopf; New 
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conclusion of the argument, proposed modifications to doctrine, and an assessment of the 
use of framing as a conceptual building block to U.S. operations in the counterinsurgency 
fight. 
 This study will show that the U.S. military has adapted its tactics to better 
facilitate these forms of soft power in order to continue to fight the counterinsurgency 
fight in Iraq. The adaptation of these tactics falls in line with prerequisites for framing to 
have its greatest effect on a society. The more that these adaptation allow U.S./CF frames 
to resonate and deny the insurgent frames resonance, the more successful the IO and 
therefore the more successful the military operations will be. 
  12
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II.  ON FRAMING AND ITS APPLICATION TO MILITARY 
OPERATIONS 
This chapter analyzes the current academic literature on framing and the 
corresponding literature utilized by the U.S. military in forming and supporting doctrine 
developed during the GWOT. In order to accomplish this I will first give an overview of 
framing with a definition of terms and current academic applications of the concept. 
Second, I will apply framing to Islamism and how it has been used in past movements in 
order to ascertain if the concept applies to the region. Finally, I will address the U.S. 
military doctrine and publications that deal with or could be improved by the concept of 
framing. The intent for this chapter is to align framing with U.S. doctrine and tactics 
applied to the Middle East and establish that the concept of framing can and should be 
applied in current U.S. operations. 
Social mobilization theory has much to offer the military in the counterinsurgency 
fight and in the provision of security to civilian populations. The U.S. military has an 
innate weakness to overcome when securing a civilian population since its most recent 
history of doing so in Vietnam was largely forgotten by the organization after the U.S. 
Army evacuated from Saigon.16  Since the end of Vietnam, social mobilization theorists 
have explored more subjective and more subtle elements of social mobilizations. The 
concept of framing provides a clear definition of a point of tactical leverage used by an 
insurgency. This concept can help military commanders identify and utilize information 
as an alternative to kinetic force when that commander is confronted with resistance 
organizations intent on destabilizing an occupying force or oppressive government 
through violent means.  
A. FRAMING 
Framing is a cognitive theory that originally came to sociology from psychiatry. 
Zald defines frames as “the specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive 
                                                 
16 Paul Yingling. “A Failure in Generalship.” Armed Forces Journal May 2007 
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cues used to render or case behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest 
alternative modes of action.”17  Johnston defined it the most succinctly when he defined 
framing as a function “much the same way as a frame around a picture: attention gets 
focused on what is relevant and important and away from extraneous items in the field of 
view.”18  Acts of oppression or injustice must be illuminated for the population to 
mobilize into a movement, or an insurgency, which means that people must be convinced 
of the necessity to move against the regime, occupational forces, or government. Thus 
collective action frames must not only define the problem, but what must be done about 
it, and why it must be done. 
The concept of framing is relatively new to social mobilization theory. Unlike its 
more quantitative, resource-based mobilization theoretical predecessors, the concept of 
framing acknowledges that there are more subjective forces to social mobilization at 
work. Within the theoretical work surrounding the concept of framing, the academic 
study is clearly led by Benford and Snow. Their work on framing illuminated the cultural 
use of symbols, frame resonance, and diagnostic/prognostic frames in order to 
demonstrate how ideology plays a part in social mobilization. Snow’s theory of framing 
came from a modification of Goffman’s concept which stated that organizations use 
“primary framing” in the attempt to “allows its user to locate, perceive, identify, and label 
a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms.”19  Goffman 
originally picked up the term “framing” from Bateson’s use in the field of psychology 
where the definitions of a situation are “built up in accordance with principles of 
organization which govern events-at least social ones-and our subjective involvement in 
them” and ‘frame’ is used in reference to these basic elements.20  
What Benford and Snow brought to this dialogue, argues McAdam, et. al., was 
the more refined definition of framing, referring to it as “the conscious strategic efforts 
by groups of people to fashion a shared understanding of the world and of themselves 
                                                 
17 Mayer N Zald.  263. 
18 Hank Johnston and John Noakes (eds). “Social Movements and the Framing Perspective.” Rowman 
& Littlefield; New York. (2005)  2. 
19 Erving Goffman. Frame Analysis. Harvard University Press; Cambridge (1974)  21. 
20 Goffman,  10. 
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that legitimate and motivate collective action.”21  McAdam, et. al., acknowledged that 
framing processes encourage mobilization as they define the problems and vulnerability 
of the system and its illegitimacy in a definition.  
Benford and Snow identify four common characteristics to collective action 
frames that will aid in focusing this study. These characteristics are: problem 
identification and direction/locus of attribution, flexibility and rigidity/ inclusivity and 
exclusivity, interpretive scope and influence, and degree of resonance. Problem 
identification and direction/locus of attribution is considered as the “most obvious”22 way 
in which frames vary. Gerhards and Rucht studied West German mobilization campaigns 
in the late 1980s and they hypothesized that “the larger the range of problems covered by 
a frame, the larger the range of social groups that can be addressed with the frame and the 
greater the mobilization capacity of the frame.”23  They add the caveat to their hypothesis 
that it only holds to those frames that can be logically or plausibly connected to each 
other. With flexibility and rigidity, inclusivity and exclusivity, Benford and Snow explain 
that the more inclusive and flexible frames are, the more likely they can become “master 
frames.”24  Master frames are those that are broader in scope and influence and act as a 
kind of blueprint for the orientation and activities of other movements. According to 
Swart, “frames that have been adopted by two or more distinctive movement… exist not 
only because of [their] qualities but also because they are culturally resonant to their 
historical milieu.25  The transportation of master frames affects U.S. IO and PSYOP as 
new master frames appear from outlying movements in the Middle East from Iran’s 
nuclear program to Hezbollah’s victory over Israel in the 2006 Summer War.  
The degree of resonance is the fourth way in which frames can vary. Two factors 
are identified by Benford and Snow as key to the variance in degree of frame resonance: 
                                                 
21 Doug Mc Adam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald (eds.). Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements. Cambridge University Press; Cambridge (1996) 7. 
22 Robert Benford and David Snow. Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and 
Assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26 (2000), 618. 
23 As quoted from J. Gerhards, D. Rucht. Mesomobilzation: Organizend and framing in Two Protest 
Campaigns in West Germany. American Journal of Sociology, vol 98,  588 in Benford and Snow, 618. 
24 Benford and Snow,  619. 
25 As referenced from W.J. Swart. Tilting the Frame: Consideration on Collective Action Framing 
From a Discursive Turn. Theory of Sociology. Vol 27 (1998) p446 by Benford and Snow,   619. 
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credibility of the frame itself and its relative salience. The credibility of a frame is a 
function of its consistency, empirical credibility, and the credibility of the frame 
articulators. Inconsistency in a frame can be found in contradictions between the frame 
and beliefs or claims, and in the popular perception of the frame articulators, whether or 
not their frame conflicts with their tactical actions. Empirical credibility has to do with 
whether or not the frame can be verified by common experience, or be proven through 
logical discourse. The credibility of the articulators ties into empirical credibility. The 
corroboration of experts with social status on a movement-worthy issue creates 
credibility of fact, since the experts are assumed to know their about their area of 
expertise, and the relatively ‘elite’ or known qualities of the articulating individual lend 
credibility to the movement. Benson and Snow use the example of peace groups enlisting 
former members of the Department of Defense, such as Admiral Eugene Carroll, Daniel 
Ellsberg, and John Stockwell, to speak at rallies in order to enhance the movement’s 
credibility. 26  
The salience of a frame has to do with its capacity to move through a society at 
multiple levels, not just through one sub-culture or compartment of society. Benford and 
Snow identify three dimensions: centrality, experiential commensurability, and narrative 
fidelity. Johnston writes that a frame must have amplification, which directly describes a 
frame’s salience. He illustrates amplification with the bumper sticker; pithy, catchy 
slogans that cut to the argument in memorable, striking, and fundamental ways. His 
examples are from the issue of abortion in the U.S.: “I’m Pro-Choice and I Vote,” “It’s a 
Child Not a Choice,” “Keep Your Hands off My Body,” and “Abortion Is Murder.”27  
These simple yet direct statements leave no question in the mind of any person who is 
even remotely aware of the issue as to what side the bearer (or driver) ascribes. These 
simple statements divide the line of battle between the rights of citizens, natural rights as 
argued by Locke and Jefferson and codified in the U.S. Constitution, and the Judeo-
Christian ethical understanding of the sanctity of life.  
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Johnston and Noakes attempt to simplify academic work on framing by defining 
frame resonance as consisting of the frame makers (what they called the social movement 
entrepreneur), the frame receivers, and the frame itself (which Kubal defines as, of 
necessity, being in the styles, forms, and normative codes of the target audience). 28  
Cutting terms and combining nuances makes the memorization of key tenants of framing 
easier for the student; however, the nuances exist for a reason: framing is a nuanced 
concept. From these sources and the academic dialogue that they encouraged, a complete 
understanding of the concept of framing can be applied in this study, but it must be 
understood that the ‘answer’ to a definition of framing is, by the very nature of framing, 
that it is not an exact science.  The variance in academic studies, proliferation of writing 
and additions to jargon and terminology can make the study of framing daunting. The 
extraction of hard numbers from frame analysis is more time-consuming than potentially 
fruitful; however, one can build the argument, as I will hereafter, that the application of 
the study of framing can help military operations in stability support operations (SASO) 
engaging in the counterinsurgency fight.  
1. Islamic Framing and Social Movements 
  Central to the U.S. Army’s fight against AQI are the Islamist leaders’ uses of 
framing in respect to jihad. The concept of jihad is covered in depth in chapter 3 which 
discusses the actual uses of the Qur’an when Muslim leaders, namely Islamist leaders, 
use the religious concept of jihad to mobilize a society to conduct religious warfare 
against an oppressive regime, or, more typically, against a non-Muslim occupying power. 
When framing jihad, these leaders rely on a rich historical religious dialogue based on the 
right leader for, the correct time to conduct, and the correct impetus to wage jihad from 
Qur’anic sources and from later Muslim scholarship. Their argument is powerful and 
focused towards a particular target audience (TA) at a particular time. This section will 
briefly show how framing is applied in Islamist leaders’ efforts to win popular support. 
Islamist leaders use political Islam to create a social movement based on religious 
identity that has had great effect on Muslim versus non-Muslim powers such as in Israel 
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and in Lebanon. Islamic activism is a formidable adversary to U.S. military operations, 
especially in the information operations arena where they hold the ‘high-ground’ of 
cultural understanding, immediate common identity, and the trust of their religious 
followers. The following section applies framing to Islamic activism and will provide a 
definition of terms and a general application by academics in this field of study. The 
work of Williams, Kubal, Benford, and Snow form a conceptual academic understanding 
of framing in a cultural context not specific to the Muslim world. The works of 
Wiktorowicz, Robinson, and Hafez will then help apply the concept of framing to the 
Muslim situation in particular; each author addresses social movement leading to warfare 
and how framing is used by leaders to justify their actions within culturally legal bounds.  
 Benford and Snow argue that the proliferation of scholarship on collective action 
frames and framing processes demonstrates the growing regard for this aspect of social 
mobilization theories as a vital dynamic alongside resource mobilization and political 
opportunity processes.29  Studying framing and its manifestations helps to further 
understanding of the issues relevant to the society, culture and temper of a given 
community. Islamic scholars have a rich background of academic work from which to 
extrapolate arguments and apply the religion to current day problems, and Jihad is only 
one of many topics of discussion. Islamists in particular have, of necessity, opened their 
own schools to train their own scholars at as high a level of competence as their religious, 
social, and political opponents. In order to disseminate their message and form a social 
base from which to influence politics, Islamists have to match wits in a highly 
competitive religious academic atmosphere.  
 The Islamists’ measure of effectiveness in this academic arena is their ability to 
manipulate doubt in the opposition and then fill this void with their own message. Doubt 
in the opposition is brought about through framing. The idea of framing comes from 
social mobilization theory, it is a tactic used by movement leaders to rally support for 
their cause while simultaneously preventing other leaders from ‘bleeding’ their ranks of 
members. The message used by the framing leader is intended to create resonance, 
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defined by Williams and Kubal as when “frames used by activists fit within the existing 
repertoire of legitimate ideological constructions” thus providing the movement activists 
with the cultural resources to dominate the public perceptions on a particular issue.30   
The hope is therefore that the population that will, in turn, be convinced to be led by 
these activists. Wiktorowicz argues that Muslim leaders are often hindered not by 
religious facts to support their arguments either for or against Jihad; rather, these leaders, 
when framing, utilize four basic strategies to promote their group of clerics and debunk 
the credibility of the opposition. These strategies are: 1. vilification or demonizing the 
oppositions’ popular clerics, 2. exaltation or praise for the “in-group” clerics, 3. 
credentialing, the emphasis placed on the particular expertise of the in-group’s 
intellectuals, and 4. de-credentialing, or raising doubts as to the oppositions’ clerics.31 
 Wiktorowicz makes the astute observation that, since there is no formal hierarchy 
within the Muslim world, the religious interpretation within the community is subject to 
the intellectual experts that are commonly or particularly favored by the community. 
Unlike the Catholic Church, there is not a living supreme pontiff (an exception to this 
rule: Twelver Shi’a have the Hidden Imam whose guidance will trump all other religious 
expertise once he returns) with the organization and authority to control religious 
doctrine. The academic requirements of a jurist are not codified and the title alim or 
religious scholar is not a formal designation or appointment. Therefore, when fatwas are 
issued, the Muslim community at large relies on the perceived character and competence 
of the scholar to determine legitimacy.32  It is therefore the nature of Islamic scholarship 
to rest on the popular perception of the scholar in question, which lends this scholarship 
particularly susceptible to framing. 
 The study of framing does not come without detractors. As Williams and Kubal 
point out, framing is overtly focused on the elites in a movement, what they say and how 
they organize their campaign of words, and the fact that most framing scholarship has 
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maintained its focus at the interpersonal level and not at the elite level.33  In effect, 
problem with culture, and therefore framing, is finding a balance between the “influence 
and processes of the active agency of human actors and the structuring power of cultural 
forms.”34  The primary problem with scholarship on framing is the lack of focus on the 
macro-culture and its overwhelming focus on interpersonal resonance.35  Though critical 
of some of the scholarship around framing, Williams and Kubal are far from throwing the 
whole concept out. Rather, they point out some of the failures of frames within the 
United States’ history (such as Marxism and Labor Rights) and relate it to the failure of 
the movement leaders to apply the intended message to the greater American culture and 
social ethics regarding labor and rights. Their application of framing to its failures only 
furthers the influence of frames on a social movement, especially when these frames are 
not in sync with the popular demands for social change. 
 Frames, whether intrinsically powerful or not, have to be targeted at social 
desires, cultural triggers, and a common social problem that a sizeable group of the 
population demand to see solved. Why people activate, revolt, and form social 
movements is an important question in understanding the frames used in creating 
movements. Ted Gurr introduced the concept of relative deprivation which argued that 
men rebel due to economic reasons. Hafez argues to the contrary that Muslims rebel due 
to a “defensive reaction to predatory state repression that threatens the organizational 
resources and lives of political Islamists.”36  Hafez’s research focuses on the Islamist 
movements in the Middle East and North Africa and finds this commonality which is 
specifically within the Qur’anic construct of jihad. 
B.  U.S. ARMY PSYOP AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) 
 The U.S. Army PSYOP branch is currently the delivery platform of the 
information battlefield in Iraq. Their operators apply the concept of framing to tactical, 
regional and theater-wide engagements between the Iraqi populace, the insurgents and 
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U.S./Coalition Forces. However, the PSYOP manuals do not mention the concept of 
framing, nor do they address the topic in a list of academic sources to read in addition to 
the manual. The mission of PSYOP is “to influence the behavior of foreign target 
audiences (TAs) to support U.S. national objectives.”37 This mission set requires 
flexibility at the organizational level of the Army that has only recently been granted. 
According to the manual, all PSYOP themes are delegated to the geographic commander 
by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) who retains PSYOP approval authority following 
the approval of the PSYOP plan by the President and/or SECDEF.38  This extreme 
centralization has caused severe restriction of the information battlefield on the tactical 
level since delegation of approval authority has been sent down only to division level.39  
This was during 2005 when a division (for example: the 2nd MARDIV based in CP Blue 
Diamond, Ar Ramadi, Iraq) covered a span of territory the size of the largest Iraqi 
province. The human terrain in Iraqi is so differentiated that one street block adheres to 
different leaders than the next. This complicates the task of simply finding 
representatives to discuss local problems that need to be addressed, imagine developing a 
talking theme that would resonate throughout the whole province while lacking the 
cultural knowledge equivalent to that of an Iraqi child.   
 In 2005-6, MAJ Gainey, the Brigade Fire Support Officer (FSO) for 1st BCT, 1st 
AD40 remarked that the time it took to achieve approval for a new theme was three weeks 
at worst, and three days at best. Through normal operations, a proposed theme would take 
three weeks to be inspected by the MARDIV commander. In order to achieve three days, 
MAJ Gainey had to clear airspace, get his PSYOP tactical detachment officer a seat on a 
helicopter and send his only PSYOP asset to the Marine Division (MARDIV) 
headquarters to speed up the approval process.41  This was not an operation that was 
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feasible to conduct on a daily basis. The nature of the insurgent’s lack of bureaucracy 
meant that the insurgents’ message could change several times in the span of time that the 
U.S./CF could achieve approval to amend their messages and themes.  
 When the U.S. Army asserts itself as a regional leader and a provider of security 
in a foreign country, it must demonstrate a resilience and flexibility in conducting its 
operations especially when the nature of its opposition is as flexible as an insurgency. 
The importance of establishing oneself as a leader worthy of following, and therefore of a 
source worthy of listening to, is a major part in the PSYOP/IO fight. Establishing 
credibility can take months of work and can be destroyed in less than an hour. This 
credibility is essential to the concept of framing, as has been stated before, since it is 
through leaders that a social movement is created and through a credible source that 
resonance in a frame can be achieved. Instigating, conducting and succeeding in an 
insurgency against a government or occupying foreign forces requires either counter-
regime leaders with social credibility or a government completely lacking in credibility. 
Denying the insurgency this political space is the essence of Psychological Warfare in 
non-conventional operations. Framing is the tool used by both sides to create a focused 
mobilization, a feeling of unity in the population, a hope in the future of the host 
country/nation, or a feeling of vulnerability in the case of the insurgents seeking to deny 
local U.S./CF supporters a foundation for continuing operations.  
C. IO 
Andrew Garfield, a contractor who provides IO classes to the military officers and 
trains command and staff groups headed into theater on regional culture and the tactics 
useful to the application of IO, argues that the U.S. Army is “the worst client I have ever 
worked for.”42  He argues this because of what he sees as the innate difference between 
good information operators and good Soldiers. One is creative, spontaneous and 
culturally savvy in the host country and generally academically credentialed in this field 
of study; the other is resourceful, prefers centralized command and control and 
measurable hard data such as kinetic attacks and body counts rather than “soft” force 
                                                 
42 Telephone Interview by author with Andrew Garfield, 31 OCT 07. 
  23
such as passing out leaflets and engaging in regional political dialogue. The advances in 
IO, Garfield argues, are in spite of the military organization, rather than because of its 
efforts.  
The U.S. Army published in 2003 their Field Manual 3-13 (FM 3-13), which 
takes IO more toward the tactical implementation.  In the introduction, paragraph one, the 
FM 3-13 defines IO as operations that “encompass attacking adversary command and 
control (C2) systems (offensive IO) while protecting friendly C2 systems from adversary 
disruption (defensive IO).”43  From its outset and throughout the field manual, the tactics 
proposed are basically conventional, computer/information warfare tactics meant to 
prevent electronic disruption of command and control channels (radio/satellite 
communications between command centers and their subordinate units) and how to 
interrupt enemy information channels. This proposed44 tactical application is 
predominately kinetic in focus and conventional in application. 
The Joint Publication 3-13 (JP 3-13) addresses the doctrinal uses of IO in the 
operations of U.S. Army, Marines, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard, but is little more 
than a transference of the contents of the Army FM 3-13 into a Joint Publication. This 
manual defines the relation of IO to military operations, the capabilities and planning 
procedures to execute IO, organizational frameworks for integrating IO in a battle staff, 
and planning considerations for developing an IO career force.45  The last of these 
directly addresses the U.S. military’s force reconstruction to create a force capable of 
fighting in a media-rich environment such as current military operations are facing. This 
manual defines information as a strategic resource that is vital to national security. The 
control of this resource, its use in shaping the battlefield in order to create an information 
environment conducive to U.S. military operations directly involves the use of framing 
and the concepts developed by social mobilization academics.  
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In reading the JP/FM 3-13, one fact continues to resurface: these publications, 
written in 2003 and 2006, are only scratching the surface and developing an 
organizationally focused, internal manual (too long to be called a memorandum) to create 
a structure conducive to operating in the information environment. The U.S. military has 
been operating in the GWOT for six years to-date and has only began at the highest levels 
to address the deficiencies it faces on this modern battlefield, away from Cold War era 
tank formations, echeloned artillery and air-power strikes that shape the conventional 
battlefield of fire and maneuver, and toward the current operational environment where 
one Soldier, ‘shooting his mouth off,’ can affect brigade or division operations in a whole 
city. For Example, the sample operations orders (OPORD) on how to integrate IO in the 
military decision making process (MDMP) list the enemy as “Tiger Corps” with two 
divisions in strength.46  These publications are more of a rough guideline for integrating 
IO as a part of a staff at brigade and above. Their chapter headings list the supporting 
efforts necessary for IO to occur: intelligence requirements, capabilities that IO lends to 
commanders, command relationships during the conduct of IO, the educational 
requirements for IO officers and staff, and advice on how to conduct IO training 
integrated with current training procedures.  
D. FM 3-24 THE COUNTERINSURGENCY MANUAL 
 Published in 2006, this manual has become the Army’s guide to current 
operations in Iraq under GEN Patraeus, who coincidentally was the officer in charge of 
preparing the manual. The counterinsurgency (COIN) manual differs from the FM/JP 3-
13 in that it openly references scholarly works such as Bernard Lewis and Robert Asprey 
among others, and military references such as David Galula, Mao Zedong and LTC Nagl. 
The reading list at the end of the manual provides the reader with sources that can help 
develop an understanding of the subtleties of COIN operations.47  The manual was 
written with the purpose to fill a ‘doctrinal gap’ in strategy and tactics revolving around 
COIN operations. The U.S. Army had trained for twenty years after Vietnam without 
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integrating the lessons learned and type of warfare carried out during that conflict and 
thus had to “reinvent the wheel” when post-invasion operations came around in Iraq. 
 In regards to framing and information operations, the FM 3-24 briefly speaks 
about “Mobilization and Message”48 where it identifies that an insurgency in its early 
stages will often rely on propaganda and intimidation which can be countered by 
information operations. The paragraph on this topic mentions that appealing to religion in 
a counter-theme approach (seeking to change a radical message into a moderate message) 
will work best if a respected local religious leader is used as the advocate. These basic 
ideas are a step in the right direction, but a reference to the concept of framing, more 
academic information on this subject and a deeper discussion on the idea of resonance 
would help to ‘flesh’ out this section even more and would, in turn, greatly aid the 
Soldier attempting to use this information in the field. 
Chapter 3 of the FM 3-24 addresses the cultural implications of fighting a 
counterinsurgency, viz. military intelligence, and the things that COIN fighters must keep 
in mind. Among these are “cultural forms”49 which are defined as “concrete 
expression(s) of the belief systems shared by members of a particular culture. Cultural 
forms include rituals, symbols, ceremonies, myths and narratives.”  These forms are the 
mediums for communicating vales, group identity and meanings that affect individual 
thought and behavior. The manual takes the idea only this far: that these forms exist and 
that they are defined as such.  
E. CONCLUSION 
 Neither the Army FM 3-13 nor the JP 3-13 contains academic references that 
would lead military personnel reading these publications to sources outside the 
Department of Defense. Since the conventional forces that are conducting “a war among  
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the people”50 are out of their conventional element in so far as the GWOT in Iraq is 
concerned, it is not far-fetched or illogical for these personnel to be exposed to academic 
theories that have been developed in support of social, economic, and political areas of 
study. The JP/FM 3-13, and the PSYOP manual (FM 3-05.30) list other government 
sources, Department of Defense memorandums, other JPs, FMs, training manuals (TMs) 
and the like, but do not reference academic work that would help military personnel 
seeking to engage in the nuanced counterinsurgency fight to understand the basic tenants 
of social mobilization which directly affect the power base of insurgencies. Only in the 
past year, with the FM 3-24 (counterinsurgency), have academic sources been listed at 
the end of the manual for further reading. This is a step in the right direction, adding the 
concept of framing will further this initiative and provide a clearer understanding for the 
military personnel conducting COIN operations. 
 Social mobilization theory, and framing in particular to this paper, offers insights 
that are either thought of as ‘self evident’ and so evidently left out of the professional 
manuals, broadly summarized, or overlooked completely. The professional pride of 
scholars and Soldiers aside, there is no reason why military personnel cannot read and 
learn from these academic sources lessons that will ultimately help prevent or disrupt the 
insurgency in Iraq.  
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III. WIELDING THE WORD OF GOD  
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the basis of Islamist framing in the 
Qur’an. The Qur’an as a document provides a rich medium for cultural understanding, 
immediate veracity as the word of God through the Prophet Mohammed, and 
immediately provides Islamist leaders with legitimacy through common faith in Muslim 
societies. Casting the ills of the society in a religious light is a “tried and true” tactic for 
social mobilization, and the purpose of this chapter is to examine just how the Qur’an is 
used by Islamist leaders to create resonance in Muslim societies. The direct application of 
this chapter to current operations in Iraq is clearly seen through Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
information operations, through their actions against U.S./CF forces, and the documented 
use of mosques by the insurgency. 
The Qur’an, as the message of God sent to the Prophet Mohammed, is a guide to 
better human living through religion, faith, and improved interpersonal relations within 
the religious community. The Hadiths are accepted sayings of the prophet handed down 
orally until several centuries after the Prophet’s death. The Muslim communal faith in the 
Qur’an and Hadiths creates a powerful bond of common language, law and understanding 
that can make the these scriptures a tool in the hands of resourceful religious leaders who 
can use the Qur’an to galvanize the resolve in a given community by framing actions 
within the religious understanding of the community. The Islamist movement has made 
an art-form of Qur’anic framing from Egypt to Lebanon. What specific verses within the 
Qur’an directly address the ideas of Jihad and legal warfare?  How are these verses used 
to create resonance within the umma?  How has the Qur’an been used to frame violent-
resistance Islamist movements in the 20th and 21st centuries?   
 The message given to the Prophet Mohammed that later became the Qur’an 
formed a religious foundation on which a state could be built. As an instrument of state, 
the Qur’an addresses the lawful justifications for warfare, the just conduct of the fighters 
in the war, and, most importantly, the return to a state of peace.51  In order to answer the 
questions of this study, one must first examine the Qur’an’s specific rules concerning 
                                                 
51 An assumption is made that the reader is at least familiar with the basic tenants of Islam. 
  28
warfare, what verses regulate the Islamic state entering, conducting and concluding war 
as well as how and where the concept of Jihad enters into this equation?  Supporting this 
study, the works of Noor Mohammed, Majid Khadduri, and Reuven Firestone will 
provide the academic foundation primarily focused on Jihad.  Each of these authors is 
concerned with the concept of Islamic war and how the Qur’an outlines God’s definition 
of just cause for war, methods while in combat, and the just ends of warfare. 
 Once the Qur’anic verses concerning warfare and martyrdom are covered, a study 
of the Islamists in particular will provide case-by-case analysis of their uses of the Qur’an 
in their justification of waging righteous war. It is the intent of this study to focus on the 
Salafi/ Wahabbi schools of Muslim jurisprudence for two reasons, first, it simplifies the 
paper to study one Islamic school of jurisprudence and, second, the choice of the Salafi 
school is made for their doctrinal focus on the Qur’an and the lives of the Prophet and his 
companions as the primary guides to ethical, just and religious behavior which further 
simplifies the paper by maintaining focus on the Qur’an and Hadiths. Other schools such 
as Shi’a, Druze, and Hanbali, to name a few, have different approaches to the 
interpretation of jihad and the uses of the Qur’an in these policies.  With this in mind, we 
will look at the beginnings of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Osama bin Laden, and 
the collected teachings and policies of Hamas in Gaza. The studies of these primary 
sources will be based on their published works, analysis from open source websites,52 
and websites set up by the group or individual. The selection of these particular Islamic 
scholars and Islamist organizations is based on their relation to current events in the 
Middle East. Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and others, were the foundational Islamist 
thinkers that created the structure of current Islamist ideological thinking in the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood and its many off-shoots. Osama bin Laden is a textbook case of 
Qur’anic framing for his cause: his is an attempt to unite the global Muslim umma in 
order to throw off the yolk of Western religious oppression. Finally, Hamas, the new-
born pseudo-state who continues to pursue a state of armed conflict with Israel and its 
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Palestinian political competitor Fatah. Hamas’ rhetoric encapsulates the Islamist fight and 
the Islamic right to wage war as a state in terms that are making headlines today. 
A. ON WAR: THE TEACHINGS OF THE QUR’AN 
 Before an analysis of the social/political uses of the Qur’an can be made, a 
suitable study in the Qur’anic provisions for warfare must be established.  The Western 
paradigm of the Middle East is still burdened with traces of 19th century romanticism: 
war-like Sheikhs in flowing robes brandishing scimitars and dying for honor. This 
stereotype feeds the image of Islam conquering rather than converting, subjugating rather 
than liberating, through hundreds of years of seamless warfare and violence. Reuven 
Firestone notes that the Middle East is no more war-torn than any other human-populated 
area, and probably a lot less so than others. He sites Quincy Wright’s tally of 278 wars 
fought worldwide from 1484 to 1945 based on a constant set of definitional criteria. Of 
the wars counted, 187 were fought in Europe and 91 were fought everywhere else.53  On 
the other hand, Majid Khadduri, in his book dedicated to Quincy Wright, also quotes the 
famed military historian in a paragraph arguing that the use of Jihad was a tool of the 
rapidly expanding Islamic state used in order to transform the Dar al-Harb (realm of 
War) into the dar al-Islam (the realm of Islam). Quincy Wright said that “the primitive 
nomad of the desert and steppes, has a hard environment to conquer . . . his terrain . . . 
leads him to institutionalize war for aggression and defense.”54  Even from one academic 
to another, quoting the same intellectual source, Jihad is a multifaceted and complex 
religious idea that has pragmatic, political, religious and social implications. 
 The word Jihad has become negatively charged in the West and immediately 
associated with radical Muslims, suicide bombers and threats to peace and stability. This 
association is less informed as it is reactionary to the symptoms of the idea of Jihad, 
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which is to “struggle or exertion of one’s power in Allah’s path”55, rather than the actual 
doctrine of Jihad which can be the internal spiritual revitalization of the self, society, 
political structure or against an oppressor. Noor Mohammed argued that a key 
misunderstanding of the West is that secular warfare is morally unacceptable within 
Islam. He states that early Muslim thinkers, such as Ibn Khaldun, postulated that wars 
had existed from the beginning of human history, and were rooted in humanity’s vengeful 
nature.56   
 There are many forms of Jihad, Firestone describes the Jihad of the heart, of the 
tongue, etc., but the Prophet focused on two: the lesser and the greater. Firestone cites the 
Prophet as saying that the best Jihad is “speaking a word of justice to a tyrannical 
ruler.”57 Although this last quote comes from the Hadiths gathered and scrutinized by 
Abu Dawud in his travels during two centuries After Hijira (A.H.)58, it is characteristic of 
two elements where the Qur’an deals directly with the subject of warfare: first, the 
established right for Muslims to speak out and even fight against religious oppression, 
second, the moral obligation of the true believer to defend the faith and the faithful.  
 Dealing with warfare, the Qur’an can be split into two time periods, first, during 
the Prophet’s time in Mecca when his political clout was not very strong and the infant 
Muslim community had to tread lightly lest it be destroyed and the message lost. The 
second period is after the Hijira when the Prophet had set up a more vibrant state within 
Medina. Both Firestone and Noor Mohammed agree that the tone of revelations 
proceeding Hijira are more passive and that, as the Muslim community grew more 
autonomous in Medina, the revelations became more conducive to conquest. Illustrating 
this, Noor Mohammed quotes Surah 22: 7859 “. . . strive in His cause, as ye ought to 
strive (with sincerity and under discipline)” to which he argues that the propagation of 
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Islam was more important than the battlefield victory.60  Surah 9: 20-22 of the Qur’an 
promises that those believers who suffer for their beliefs and give of themselves and their 
‘goods’ will “have the highest rank in the sight of God, they are the people who will 
achieve salvation.”  Yusuf Ali, a respected and well known Muslim scholar whose 
translations and commentaries on the Qur’an have shaped Islamic studies in the West, 
said that the verse from Surah 9 “may require fighting in God’s cause, as a form of self-
sacrifice” but that the verse shows the true essence of Jihad, that the sincere faith focused 
on God melts all worldly thoughts of gain away and that the earnest striving is 
completely in the service of God. Fighting alone is not the true spirit of Jihad, the 
scholar’s writings, a man’s wealth, and the preacher’s voice may bring the most valuable 
Jihad.61 
 The Qur’an does address actual fighting as a Jihad, too, Surah 2: 190-195 is 
probably the most remarked upon verse as it delves into detail the prohibitions and 
allowances for the uses of force under God’s law.62  According to Noor Mohammed, this 
verse belongs in the Medina period, the time in which the new Muslim community had 
established itself as a political entity and could function as a state against the Meccan 
pagans. Yusuf Ali states that Muslims know that war is an evil, but that Muslim men will 
not shrink from it when honor, courage, obedience, discipline, duty and a righteous Imam 
command that war be done in order to preserve the faith. 
 Reuven Firestone’s work, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam, examines the 
social and political motives to the creation of Jihad. Although the purpose of this paper is 
not to delve into the history of Jihad, rather it is to see where the Qur’an is used to frame 
the execution of violence by Islamists within the span of the last one hundred years, 
Firestone’s work is applicable in finding the Qur’anic references to the use of holy war 
and he does well to provide examples, though they are certainly buried under several 
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centuries of history. The origins of Jihad are also part of the definitions for its use in 
social movements and settings because history, like religion, is the property of the 
community in which it is shared.    
 Islamic law on warfare and controlled violence naturally grew with the size and 
vitality of the umma, the need to consolidate the faithful and clarify the message placed 
the Prophet at the forefront of policing his growing religion in Mecca, but he had less 
constraints after the Hijira when he was the head of Medina. Firestone separates the 
Qur’anic legislation on war into four traditional stages: 1. non-confrontation, 2. defensive 
fighting, 3. initiating attack is allowed within ancient strictures, and 4. the unconditional 
command to fight all unbelievers, referred to hereafter as stages one-four respectively.63   
 Stage one quotes Surah 15 “Therefore expound openly what thou art commanded, 
and turn away from those who join false gods with Allah, for sufficient are We unto thee 
against those who scoff.”64  This verse is a comfort to the oppressed that are not in 
position to fight. Much like Psalms 23:4 “Even though I walk through the valley of the 
shadow of death, I will fear no evil, for you are with me . . .”65  In both verses, the fact 
that God is sufficient and that one’s faith is correctly placed in Him; Firestone, citing 
Muslim scholars such as Tafsir Muqatil b. Sulayman and Tabari agree that this verse 
came from the early days of Islam, maybe even the first two years of the Prophet’s 
preaching the message.66  Surah 16:125 commands that the faithful open dialogue with 
the non-believers and, through one’s wisdom and command of language, inform them of 
the ways of God. Interestingly, Surah 16:126, the very next verse, claims that if the 
believer decides to punish, then he should punish equally to the affliction, i.e., lex talionis 
‘an eye for an eye.’ However, verse 127 and 128 admonish that it is best to “. . . be 
patient, for thy patience is but from Allah. Nor grieve over them and distress not thyself 
because of their plots. For Allah is with those who restrain themselves, and those who do 
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good.”67  Firestone notes that several Muslim exegetes, namely Ibn al-Jaqzi, claim that 
this verse is abrogated by the Sword Verse, but that all together, the believers should 
argue with the non-believers, and those who do not agree should get the sword.68     
 Stage two, defensive fighting, begins with Surah 22:39-40 claims that “to those 
against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight)”69  Those who are attacked are 
the wronged party and Allah will be most powerful in His aid to those who are expelled 
from their homes for proclaiming that their faith in God. Ibn Zayd recorded that the 
permission to fight was withheld from the Muslims for ten years and that this verse is 
considered to be the first verse allowing Muslims to use physical force.70  Ibn Zayd and 
other exegetes argued that the allowance of Surah 22:39 abrogated verses that 
admonished more passive means of conflict resolution such as Surah 7:180 which states 
that the believer should simply leave the company of those that misuse the name of 
God.71  The allowance of violence is a slippery slope in religious wars and the regulation 
of zealots and radicals who would sway or slay non-believers has to be clear and to the 
point. Surah 2:190 accomplishes this regulation by allowing Muslims to fight against 
those who attack, but demands that their actions be limited to the paths that God defines; 
His wrath is against those who transgress His laws.  
 Stage three, making the initiating attack is allowed within the ancient strictures, 
begins with Surah 2:217 which mitigates breaking old Arabic codes of warfare in the 
name of saving the religion and the believers from losing their faith, thereby dying as 
unbelievers and destined for hellfire. Firestone’s evolutionary theory of Islam ties this 
revelation to the raid led by Abdallah b, Jabsh al-Asadi in which a Meccan caravan driver 
named was killed in the year 624 C.E. on either the last day of Rajab or the first day of 
Jumada al-Akhira, one of the four sacred months (which prohibit fighting). Likewise, 
Surah 2:191 states “Kill them wherever you find them and turn them out from where they 
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have turned you out, for fitna72 is worse than killing, but do not fight them at the Sacred 
Mosque unless they fight you there. But if they fight you, kill them. Such is the reward of 
the unbelievers.”73  The right to self-defense is therefore paramount to any social 
understandings no matter how ancient or accepted. The protection of the faith and the 
umma abrogate all other calls to discourse or leniency.  
 In stage four, the unconditional command to fight all unbelievers, Surah 2:216 is 
invoked which states that fighting is commanded of the believers even though it may 
seem disagreeable to the individual. The verse reasons that it is possible that a man may 
dislike that which is good for him and love that which is bad. The empirical truth to this 
argument is in no other way tied through reason other than God knows that which the 
believer does not. Forefront in the Islamic rules of engagement is the Sword Verse, Surah 
9:574 states that, once the sacred months are through, fighting and slaying the non-
believers (Pagans) wherever they are found is allowed. The one proviso in this verse is 
that once peace is sought (and conversion immanent if not beginning) then mercy must be 
given as Allah is “Oft-forgiving.”75  Scholarship is split on the meaning of the verse on 
four issues: 1. the meaning of the ‘Sacred months,’ whether they refer to the original 
Arab sacred months, 2. prohibitions of killing non-believer prisoners of war, 3. why only 
three of the five pillars of Islam may be construed from the verse, and 4. the purpose for 
fighting.76 
 Similar to Christianity, in Islam one can find text to support a multitude of 
conclusions. Those exegetes that border on the militant interpretation of the Qur’an argue 
the abrogation of more compassionate treatment of non-believers whereas more moderate 
scholars will provide their own Hadiths to support their interpretations. The war-like 
language grows in intensity as the new Islamic state progresses in size and physical 
power through military victories against the Meccans.  The meaning of Jihad in a 
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military sense implies the use of mandatory violence in order to subjugate the 
unbelievers, limiting warfare only to combatants, compassion when the enemy is 
converted, and focusing on the aims of God and not the desires of man (e.g., wealth, 
remuneration and/or revenge). These themes as well as the verses from where they 
originate are necessary in formulating how the Qur’an is used to frame political, social 
and military actions today. 
B. THE QUR’AN’S WAR DOCTRINES APPLIED 
1.  The Muslim Brotherhood 
 The early 20th century forced hard facts on the Muslim community. The fall of the 
Ottoman Empire removed the last vestiges of Islamic Shar’iah Law in the heartland of 
Islam. Much of the Muslim world was ruled, if not directly as in India and Algeria then 
through proxy as in Iran and the Hashemite Dynasty in Jordan, by Western powers. This 
turn of events led to deep internal scrutiny in the Muslim community.  Muhammed Hadi 
al-Birjundi asked Rashid Rida (a modernist) in 1913 about the nature of jihad, whether it 
was defensive when it so aggressively spread its borders from India to Spain. Al-Birjundi 
continued his line of questioning to a more personal issue: if Islam conquered 
‘defensively’ as it says that it did, then how is it any better than the Western colonists 
who do the same in the name of economics and ‘civilization?’77  Rida’s answer was that 
the Muslim’s non-believing neighbors prevented the proclamation of the truth and 
therefore obligated the faithful to fight them. “Our religion” Rida claimed “is not like 
others that defend themselves . . . but our defense of our religion is the proclamation of 
truth and the removal of the distortion and misrepresentation of it.”78  Thus the definition 
of Jihad was the proclamation of the truth and when applied to fighting, it was only in the 
defense, which Rida had conveniently contorted into a semi-offensive/pre-emptive 
theory. 
 Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 at the age of 22 in an 
attempt to lead a revival of Islam and return to a study of its primary texts. In a pamphlet 
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he responds to the question of why Muslims fight. Al-Banna responds with a quote from 
the Qur’an, Surah 8:61,79 he argues that God’s obligation of Jihad is neither a means to 
personal gain, nor a means of aggression; rather, it was meant to protect the proclamation 
of Islam which guides people to justice.80  The inclusion of Surah 8:61 grants that peace 
must be given where asked so that the truth of Islam can be spread.  With this in mind, 
fighting should not be avoided simply because it is fighting; rather, the intention of the 
Muslim fighter must be secured in the right reasoning. 
 Sayyid Qutb (executed in 1966) can be argued to be the founder of radical Islam. 
During a two year academic visit to the Unite States, he was so disgusted with the lack of 
morality, decency and self restraint that he witnessed in the capitalist system and 
American culture that he completely rejected all of Western ideology. His basic argument 
is that all ideologies other than Islam, and particularly the West, have failed. Essentially, 
Islam has come full circle and now, globally, is beset by the ignorant (Jahiliyya) just as 
the Prophet Mohammed and his early congregation were beset by the Meccan pagans and 
idolaters. His answer is a revival of Islam through simplifying all teachings back to the 
“unique Qur’anic experience” of the original Muslim community who had nothing more 
than the revelation of the Qur’an to guide them.81 
 On Jihad Qutb says that, first, the entirety of Islamic religious and social teaching 
is a realistic one, jihad is a part of that system; therefore, Jihad is a reality making 
realistic demands on the followers. Second, jihad is a rational doctrine. That is to say, 
minus the manipulating exegetes, the Qur’an’s teaching on Jihad has a logical 
progression, an escalation of force, from peaceful proclamation to unlimited warfare. 
Essentially, Jihad is the “means by which Muslims ensure that the proclamation of Islam 
is heard.”82  The caveat, however, is that “there is no compulsion in religion”; therefore 
the nature of Jihad is not the same as that of modern warfare, nor are its methods and 
aims similar since Jihad was given to the followers of Islam in order to carry out the will 
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of God.83  Therefore there is no need of an apologia for Jihad, nor is there a need for a 
defense of the religion because of this doctrine; rather, Qutb argues that Jihad removes 
the material and physical barriers to the spreading of Islam within either the community 
or the individual. 
 Sayyid Qutb’s call to revive Islam as the cure-all to Western decadence was 
neither a command to destroy the West, nor a ‘Luddite’ rebellion against the advances of 
science and economics. Rather, Qutb said that Islam was the cure for the West’s 
decadence and religious poverty that was causing its gradual loss of world power and 
influence.84  His thorough understanding and teaching of the Qur’an framed the 
relationship between the Islamists and their imposter-governments in the simple, concise 
and clear forms defined by the Prophet as the Muslims, those with which there is peace 
bartered, and those that continually wish to fight against Islam; these ideas he took 
directly from the Qur’an and applied them to the world during his time. The need to fight, 
therefore, is only manifest when the peace of the umma is threatened by an un-Islamic 
force (e.g., the authoritarian governments throughout Muslim lands).  
2. Osama bin Laden 
 By far the most infamous and clearly proven advocate for the Sword Verse (Surah 
9:5), Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda blasted their way to notoriety on 11 September 
2001 but their struggle against the Western powers began in 1989. Their basic tenant is 
the unification of all Islamic peoples and countries, forcing the conversion or migration 
of all non-Muslims within mixed societies and unifying the community of the faith under 
a new caliphate in order to protect the faithful from the decadent and secular West. The 
vast sea of coverage and focus on bin Laden as the face of Jihadi terrorist attacks on 
innocent civilians makes and study of bin Laden an attempt to tame an academic 
leviathan. However, there is much to be said on his position as a key leader in the Islamic 
resistance to Western interference in Muslim lands and how he uses that position to frame 
attacks on civilians as a just war. 
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 Framing is a tactic used by a leader to get his message across; by studying the 
‘echo’ of this message from supporters and the dissonance caused by opponents can 
demonstrate just how well the frame penetrated. In a popular Al-Jazeera talk show “The 
Opposite Direction,” Osama Safar, a Kuwaiti columnist who opposed Osama bin Laden 
and Abdallah bin Matruk Al-Hadd, a Saudi preacher from the Ministry of Islamic Affairs 
in Saudi Arabia and supporter of bin Laden stated their points for and against bin Laden’s 
attacks. Al-Hadd remarked that: 
...There is no doubt that Osama bin Laden waged Jihad against the 
infidels, against the aggressor and the oppressor. America does not want 
Islamic principles [to exist] on the face of this planet. It does not want the 
full implementation of Islam's values and principles... It does not want 
there to be a free Islamic economy.85 
and 
Like all other Muslims, bin Laden wanted to apply the Shari'a fully with 
its values, principles, economics, media, and education. Even in sports 
there should be Shar'i sport.86 
 
Al-Hadd’s support of Osama bin Laden’s attacks on America was in defiance of a Saudi 
mandate prohibiting any support of the former Saudi businessman.  
 In response to the U.S. air-strike that resulted in the death of Abu Mus’ab Al-
Zarqawi, Osama bin Laden jeered at President Bush claiming that, though he struck down 
a lion of Jihad, another was sure to take his place. Bin Laden claimed Zarqawi’s defense 
of Islam, his fight for the restoration of Palestine and his avenging of the oppressed as a 
part of this warrior’s Jihadi accomplishments. Bin Laden said, "Our Muslim nation has 
lost its intrepid hero - the lion of jihad, a man of resolve and action, Abu Mus'ab Al-
Zarqawi - Ahmad Al-Khalayla - who was killed in a criminal American attack, 'To Allah 
we belong, and to Him we return.' [Surah, 2:156] May Allah grant his wish and accept 
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him as a martyr, reward him generously, and comfort his family and relations...”87  His 
quoted verse is preceded by verses 2:153-15588 which claim the good tidings for those 
who suffer for their faith in God. The verses claim that faith in God will not be without 
tests of “fear and hunger”89 but that the losses of goods and possibly lives will only yield 
glad tidings to those who have patient faith in God’s reciprocity. Thus the loss of Zarqawi 
is a sacrifice that the Jihadis take as a sign of testing from God and a boding of good 
returns in the future as the wages of this suffering for the defense of the faithful.  
 Bin Laden reiterates three frames in his campaign that have a tested and proven 
capability to resonate with the Muslim society and are reminiscent of Qutb and al-
Bannah: 1. that Islam is beset by a secular and irreligious enemy that will not accept the 
Prophet’s message and desires to fight, thus Surah 9:5 justifies the slaying of the non-
believers ‘wherever you find them.’  2. that those who fight for the religion and suffer the 
consequences of their faith are bound to reap the favor of God himself (Surah 2:153-56). 
Finally, 3. that Islam is the only answer to the social ills of secular governments and that 
the Qur’an is sufficient for the faithful. His is a minimalist approach to religious literature 
and commentary which conveniently cuts down on bin Laden’s reading list as he and the 
majority of his followers are engineers rather than clerics. 
3. Hamas 
 The Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (HAMAS also means “zeal” in Arabic) 
emerged in 1987 in competition with the secular Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO). Originally a branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas derives much of 
its political ideology from its parent organization. It is an organization with multi-level 
objectives. Regionally, their objective is to negate the Jewish state of Israel and reinstate 
the original Palestinian state under Islamic Shar’iah law. They base this on the perception 
(not wholly unfounded) that the Israeli government is increasingly war-like in its 
interactions with Arabs who were forced out of their native lands by “Zionists.”  Hamas’ 
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relations with their Jewish neighbors is best illustrated through a commentary article 
referring to the Tel Aviv soccer team and its fans singing songs insulting to Islam and the 
Prophet Mohammed on 29 August 2007, that was posted on their website, 
www.Palestinian-Info.co,uk,  
However, it is also true that the obnoxious incident expressed and 
reflected to a large extent an increasingly hateful and xenophobic 
culture bordering on fascism, which explains why the bulk of the 
Israeli Jewish society is so numb and callous toward the nearly daily 
killing by Israeli soldiers of Palestinian children and civilians. (five 
Palestinian children were murdered last week.)90  
  
Globally, Hamas perceives itself as the frontlines and frontrunner of the pan-
Islamist international movement. Khaled Mishal, the head of Hamas’ political bureau 
said “Hamas is not a local organization but the spearhead of a national project, which has 
Arab, Islamic and international ambitions as well.”91  Hamas is organized into three 
political wings, social welfare (dawa) and the political wings (A’alam is a publications/ 
media branch that distributes leaflets and propaganda) are the public face of the 
organization; the military wing (Mujihadeen al-Filastinun and the security branch Jehaz 
Aman is responsible for finding, interrogating, and punishing collaborators) is mostly 
engaged in clandestine and guerrilla operations. 
While Hamas’ fight is certainly more political in nature, it frames its right to rule 
and its right to resist in the Qur’an. As a primarily Salafi movement, Hamas believes in 
the purity of the Prophet’s message and his companions who helped form Islam in the 
beginning. Their religious goal of establishing a true Islamic state, ruled by Shari’ah law 
as the Prophet dictated thirteen-hundred years ago, has internal political implications: if 
Hamas is ‘righteous’ in the eyes of God, then the PLO is not. The Western inclusion of 
the PLO in peace talks and exclusion and vilification of Hamas only reinforces the 
religious iniquity of the PLO to Hamas and its followers. To Hamas’ credit, it follows 
                                                 
90 Khalid Amayreh. “When will Zionist Jews stop cursing other religions?”  reporting from East 
Jerusalem, Stable URL: 
http://www.palestineinfo.co.uk/en/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s78%
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yhMkyG70AHASu%2bt7PljBSrdOG%2b8hyWye40%3d. Accessed 10 SEP 2007. 
91 Matthew Levitt. Hamas. Yale University Press, New Haven (2006),  9. 
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more closely to the patterns of just war and peace that the Qur’an outlines and adheres to 
its cease-fires made with Israel across the organization, which is something that the PLO 
cannot accomplish in its present fractured state. 
Treating Hamas as a different religious ideology from Sayyid Qutb and Hassan 
Al-Bannah’s Muslim Brotherhood is a difficult task and results in ‘hair-splitting.’  The 
real difference is the political aims of Hamas which is a function of the different nature of 
Hamas’ fight to the Muslim Brotherhood’s fight in the 1940s-70s. Hamas’ victory in the 
2005-6 elections forced it to moderate its strictly Islamic policies to appeal and apply to 
the multi-religious/multi-ethnic reality that is the Palestinian state. With the 2007 fissure 
opened between Hamas and Fatah (the PLO’s lead party), Hamas will continue to be 
under scrutiny internally as well as internationally.  
C. CONCLUSION  
Islam was born a social movement; it was an answer to an unfulfilling, 
fractured, pagan existence that created a unified Arab nation of believers, as an 
immediate consequence, and an empire of new converts from the Iberian 
Peninsula to the Indian Subcontinent. The Prophet’s message of salvation utilized 
existing Arab cultural messages, linguistics and norms that are codified in the 
Qur’an and understood by all Arabs in order to further Islam’s legitimacy and 
religious palatability to the Arab community. Jihad is a call to arms, in effect a 
social movement, organized by accepted leaders. As David Cook’s definition of 
Jihad, in reference to that contingent of today’s Muslim community who associate 
the idea with warfare, explains that it is  
warfare authorized by a legitimate representative of the Muslim 
community for the sake of an issue that is universally, or nearly 
universally, acknowledged to be of critical importance for the 
entire community against an admitted enemy of Islam.92 
                                                 
92 David Cook. Understanding Jihad. University of California Press, Berkley (2006),  3. 
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The Qur’an has the structural capacity to build an Islamic state and all the 
regulations to guide that state with internal and international affairs and policies. Warfare 
is one of the international political tools of the state and is covered in detail within the 
Qur’an. As a source of the supreme religious authority with the Muslim community, the 
Qur’an has power that can be easily tapped into by enterprising leaders who are intent on 
creating a social movement. Entwined in the Qur’anic doctrine of warfare is the 
individual’s faith, that the devout are ready and willing to risk property, security, life, and 
welfare for the will of God and that that sacrifice will yield a more righteous end in one’s 
life. The Prophet Mohammed was a movement leader who lived in violent times and 
often had to resort to warfare in order to accomplish his divine mission. As such, the 
writings of the Qur’an address and reflect the political obstacles placed before the new-
born Islamic faith, these principles mirror social movements’ obstacles today and can 
therefore create a ready narrative to compare modern plights to the holy plights of God’s 
last messenger on earth. Is this also part of the quotes?   
The struggles of the faithful are timeless; suffering and misery are recognizable 
and create immediate sympathy within a population. The Qur’an presents a form of 
warfare that yielded absolute victory and a glorious past to the Prophet and his 
companions that naturally creates a sense of common pride and community for Muslims. 
Tapping into this common narrative has bolstered the Islamists’ right to be the arbiters, or 
rightful instigators, of holy war. Why is this a single spaced? 
A clear line of success from Afghanistan in the 1980s against the Soviet Army to 
“martyrs” in the Lebanese-Israeli conflict (1982-2002) and the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflicts has only given more legitimacy and leverage to Islamist leaders when they call 
for war. They no longer need to call solely on the example of the Prophet; rather, they 
can and do use his fight as the model for religious warriors in opposition to infidel 
occupiers and armies to create a simple story wherein popular perception of reality can be 
curbed into social activation and insurgency, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
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IV. FRAMING APPLIED IN CURRENT U.S. OPERATIONS (IO) 
IN IRAQ: IO IN THE FIELD 
Social mobilization theory’s application to military doctrine is not directly 
associated with kinetic operations, such as those operations that are traditionally 
associated with conventional warfare. In conventional operations, the use of IO and 
PSYOP are considered as part of the ‘shaping’ of the battlefield through fires and effects. 
In counterinsurgency operations (COIN), however, the use of pure kinetic force often 
jeopardizes the larger mission which is to secure the civilian population and prevent 
further support of the insurgency.  
The concept of framing applies to military operations in the areas of PSYOPS and 
IO. The counterinsurgency fight currently being waged in Iraq relies heavily on these 
tools in order to bring about victory on the battlefield. The purpose of this chapter is to 
examine how the U.S. military fighting in Iraq is adapting to the information-based fight 
in order to meet its enemy, namely al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), on his own battlefield and 
defeat him in the arena of hearts and minds. This process of adapting to non-conventional 
warfare by a conventional army is currently changing doctrine, developing a new 
generation of warriors and leaders, and creating a greater organizational awareness on 
information warfare. This chapter is a combination of scholarly work on IO/PSYOPS and 
framing, and the result of information collected from primary sources through interviews 
by the author with U.S. Army officers who have fought the IO fight and their perceptions 
of the current state of U.S. information operations as an organization and as a useful 
tactic.  
 This chapter applies framing to U.S. military operations in Iraq in three sections: 
the first section is a vignette focused on Ron Schleifer’s lessons learned by the Israeli 
Defense Forces (IDF) during the Palestinian Intifada where a conventional force 
conducted stability operations without an in-depth IO campaign and how their opponents, 
the Palestinians, were able to mobilize using their dominance of the IO battlefield. The 
second section begins the analysis of U.S. IO/PSYOP integration by addressing the 
changing force structure in the brigade staff that is facilitating the use of IO in daily 
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operations. The third section addresses the successes that have happened since the 
command-driven integration of IO in U.S. operations and includes three vignettes: 
Operations Al Fajr, 1-1AD operations in Ramadi, and PSYOP in al Anbar Province based 
on an interview with the PSYOP detachment commander. This chapter argues that, as IO 
and PSYOP are important to the COIN mission currently set in Iraq, framing as a 
cognitive theory applicable to military operations countering social mobilization (i.e., 
insurgency) is therefore important for the edification of the Soldiers and Marines tasked 
with executing COIN operations. 
 The focus of this chapter is to see where the U.S. is achieving success in Iraq, if 
any, in the IO battlefield and where framing is applied in this fight. The ability of the 
conventional forces to adapt to this unconventional battlefield is a secondary objective of 
this paper. This focus directly engages the concept of framing and counter-framing as it is 
used by U.S. and CF to combat AQI and other insurgent groups by denying them the 
support base within the local population. Since this paper is unclassified, detailed analysis 
of the frames used (such as verbatim messages) and exact percentages on their effect will 
not be included. However, much can be learned about the importance of framing to these 
operations through the changes in the U.S. force structure at the tactical level (brigade 
and below), through the changing focus of U.S. commanders at theater to tactical levels, 
and the gains being accomplished through the application of PSYOPS and IO within Al 
Anbar Province, Iraq.  
A. SCHLEIFER: AN APPLICATION OF IDF LESSONS LEARNED  
Military doctrine is shaped by experiences gained on the battlefield. Much of U.S. 
doctrine is based on the experiences of past generations of Soldiers and the lessons 
learned from allied nations as well as enemy tactics that have been analyzed and 
incorporated. This being said, a short vignette on the Palestinian Intifada is applicable to 
this chapter because of its relevance to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.  
Ron Schleifer’s book, Psychological Warfare in the Intifada93, applies 
Psychological Warfare and IO tactics used by the Palestinians during the Intifada 
                                                 
93 Ron Schleifer. Psychological Warfare in the Intifada. Sussex Academic Press; Portland. (2006). 
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(December 1987-December 1989). Important to this study, Schleifer’s work uses U.S. 
military manuals on PSYOP as measure for his analysis. Therefore, it is based on his 
model and analysis of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) presented in this section that 
following analysis in this chapter will be conducted of the U.S. and CF in Iraq’s use of IO 
and PSYOPS as a force multiplier in combat at the tactical level.  
Schleifer’s work analyzes the use of media in the Intifada and the application of 
the media that each side (Israeli and Palestinian) used in support of their operations, the 
Israelis in securing and pacifying, the Palestinians in activating the population and 
painting the global response to the Intifada. This conflict can be easily applied to current 
U.S. operations in Iraq since the U.S./CF are arrayed similarly to the IDF, a conventional 
force utilizing hierarchical command structure and information/intelligence flows, and 
seeking to secure a foreign population. Whereas the Palestinian forces are arrayed more 
like AQI94 where they are attempting to mobilize the population against these 
conventional security forces, gather resources and support from the population, and 
launch successful attacks on security forces which achieves two goals: it damages U.S. 
public opinion who dislike loss of American lives and equipment and it denies the 
U.S./CF claim to be providing security for the young Iraqi state. 
 Political warfare, or PSYOP as Schleifer defines it per U.S. military doctrine, 
presupposes the planned execution of warfare in the political arena; however, the 
Palestinian activists most likely did not begin the Intifada with a plan clear enough to 
wage political warfare.95  Though the beginning of the Intifada was arguably 
spontaneous, the movement was sustained for two years despite the best attempts of an 
experienced and well funded IDF to intervene and disrupt the movement. This level of 
organization occurring suddenly in response to political gains is indicative of insurgent 
operations as well as simple mobilization. The difference being that an insurgency is a 
political grab for power, a mobilization can simply be a demonstration of unified concern 
in order to gain attention from the regime and to ask the regime to address the problem. 
                                                 
94 This is not to say that AQI is in anyway politically like the Palestinians per se; on the tactical level 
alone, their fight based on force structure and their methods employed against a kinetically stronger and 
technologically superior IDF makes the Palestinians and AQI similar. 
95 Schleifer,  viii. 
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Palestinian political warfare during the Intifada had two goals in respect to the 
Palestinian people: to maintain high morale to withstand IDF attacks and Palestinian 
casualties and to maintain the impression of a knowing and capable leadership. Towards 
the Israelis, the Palestinians desired to lower the morale of society and within the IDF 
ranks themselves. Second, they sought to persuade the IDF that their actions were futile 
and thereby shake the IDF’s confidence in their ability to control the territories while 
decreasing the Israeli fear of a Palestinian state. Towards neutral target audiences, 
Palestinians sought to reinforce the notion that the IDF were immoral and that justice 
should be done.96   
These goals are important choke-points in the information battlefield. Schleifer 
argues that the Palestinians succeeded in capturing the IO fight because of their 
willingness to reveal their tactics to the public eye. Being weaker in conventional terms 
of men and arms, the Palestinians painted the IDF as the oppressor through the most 
familiar form of semi-violent protest: throwing stones. The news media published 
countless photos and footage of young Palestinian males hurling stones at heavily armed, 
advancing IDF troops to the growing condemnation of the world. Prior to the Intifada, the 
Israelis were thought to be surrounded by conventional Arab threats. The 1948, 1967 and 
1973 wars all placed Israel on the defense or matched against equal forces and emerging 
decisively victorious. This is one example how Israel had control over the information 
battlefield prior to the Intifada. Schleifer argues that the IDF spent too much time 
attacking Palestinian leaders, utilizing their technologically superior intelligence 
capabilities to ‘snatch’ movement leaders, and not enough time on telling their story on 
the Intifada. The Palestinian successful IO and PSYOP revealed an Israeli weakness and 
has paved the way for Palestinian state-building. 
There are two lessons from Schleifer’s study that are directly applicable to U.S. 
military operations in Iraq: first is that the target for COIN operations is neither the 
leaders of the insurgents, nor the insurgents themselves; rather, it is the populace that 
must be addressed. The Intifada was successful because it utilized symbols that were 
convincing and resonated both within the Palestinian society and to the outside world. 
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Furthermore, the preferred Palestinian method of engagement with the IDF was throwing 
rocks. This certainly was not an effective way to engage heavily armed troops if the 
purpose was to defeat them conventionally; rather the rocks were symbols of resistance 
and the rock-wielding Palestinian became the ‘poster-child’ of the Intifada.  
Second: the messaging needs to address the specific target audiences (TA). The 
Palestinians created a PSYOP plan that addressed their own population, the Israeli 
society, the IDF and the global media with specific messages that they developed through 
trial and error. These specified messages shaped the information battlefield and resonated 
within the target audiences turning each IDF use of force into a further injustice. Framing 
directly applies to these lessons, as chapter two describes. Applying these concepts in 
COIN operations forces the commanders involved to address the IO battlefield and 
increases the possibility that the insurgency could be denied its greatest asset: global 
vindication. 
B. CHANGES IN U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE: ADAPTING TO THE 
BATTLEFIELD 
 The importance of IO to the COIN fight is evident in the force structure 
modifications that are occurring in the Army. Prior to 2007, Brigade (BDE) staffs handed 
the IO responsibilities to the BDE Fire Support Officer (FSO) as an ‘extra hat.’  FSO’s 
conventional duties are to plan and coordinate fires into a combined arms operation 
between the maneuver elements in the BDE and the fire support assets (artillery, aviation, 
naval gunfire, close air support). The FSO’s duties are conventionally focused on 
combining battlefield intelligence, maneuver firepower, and the available fire support 
assets together in order to accomplish the maneuver commander’s mission.97  There is 
nothing the Field Artillery’s Officer Basic or Advanced Courses that deals with 
Information Operations until January 2006. However, Field Artillery Officers in BDE 
FSO roles were taking on the role of IO officer as a part of the maneuver commander’s 
effects planning.98 
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 MAJ Andrew Gainey was the BDE FSO for COL MacFarlane’s 1st Brigade 
Combat Team (BCT), 1st Armored Division (AD) in Ramadi, Iraq from 2006-7. As the 
BDE FSO, his commander gave him the IO job and it was up to him to find out how to 
do it. Basically, MAJ Gainey learned IO from ‘scratch’ and how to apply it through on 
the job training. As the defense analyst Andrew Garfield commented, the success of men 
like MAJ Gainey are in spite of the system, not because of it. Many of the IO officers that 
MAJ Gainey came in contact with had no clue as to how to do their job, much less 
instruct MAJ Gainey.  
 On his Fires and Effects Staff, MAJ Gainey had his BDE Fire Support Element 
(usually consists of a senior lieutenant/junior captain, a sergeant first class (E7) and two 
to four soldiers), the PSYOP team leader (a captain), the battalion air officer (Air Force), 
and a civil affairs (CA) officer (USMC). The PSYOP team leader was the subject matter 
expert in IO and how to use it on the battlefield. The PSYOP team would send Soldiers 
into sector in order to gather data on the messages, target audiences (TAs), and 
messaging methods of the enemy. Although MAJ Gainey worked well with his PSYOP 
and CA officers, neither he nor his commander rated these men. Thus, the organizational 
loyalty was to their chain of command and they simply worked with 1-1AD.  
 The communications channels were different for the PSYOP officer, too. While 
on a mission, the PSYOP teams would gather data, bring it back to the base and process a 
report that would be consolidated at Camp Fallujah where the PSYOP detachment 
commander was. Usually, the PSYOP team leader was very good at reporting to both his 
commander and the BDE commander, which, out of professional courtesy, he would 
make sure the BDE commander was aware of the reports. On one occasion, the PSYOP 
team leader neglected to report to the BDE commander, but still sent in his report to his 
detachment commander who reported directly to the division commander. When the 
division commander questioned COL MacFarlane about some graffiti in his sector, 
reported by the PSYOP detachment, COL MacFarlane was not aware of the situation. 
Fortunately the incident was not significant enough to warrant an emergency response; 
however, the incident caused friction within the unit thereby reducing its effectiveness in 
an unforgiving combat environment. 
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 As of 2007, the BDE staff has been augmented with an IO trained and qualified 
officer, the “S7.”  The BDE IO officer works as a part of the Effects Coordination Cell 
(ECORD) along with the BDE FSO. According to MAJ Munsey, the ECORD is a “major 
sustain”99 from the after-action review comments from previous deployments. Extending 
the scope of the staff better addresses the battlefield in total and allows the BDE 
commander to focus the efforts of his staff on winning in the COIN environment. The 
U.S. Army is adapting to the COIN fight and learning, but the nature of military 
adaptation is that it is explicitly command driven. The focus on IO and its integration 
with kinetic operations was not a priority prior to the arrival of GEN David Petraeus. 
Likewise, the successes in al Ramadi under COL MacFarlane were due to the command 
climate which forced subordinate commanders to apply IO to their operations.100  The 
importance of commanders to the conduct of COIN operations is that they are the ones 
that set the pace for their subordinates and the criteria for success on a battlefield that is 
completely without immediate or decisive results to actions. Conventionally trained and 
generally resistant to the fluidity of the COIN environment, commanders are hesitant to 
exercise the patience required to conduct COIN operations. The addition of academic 
works regarding framing could help foster a better understanding of the measures of 
success for conventionally trained Soldiers fighting in an unconventional environment. 
C. REINFORCING SUCCESS IN THE IO BATTLEFIELD 
1.  U.S. Military Application: Al Anbar Province, Iraq, 2004-07 
 Al Anbar Province is seated at the southwestern point of the ‘Triangle of Death,’ 
as it has been labeled by the media. It was a hotbed of support for Saddam Hussein and 
includes the cities of (from West to East) Hit, Ramadi, Habbinaya, and Fallujah. Al 
Anbar is the largest province in Iraq and its terrain consists of the Euphrates River basin 
and desert. Demographically, al Anbar is mostly Sunni, with some Kurdish settlements 
and Shi’a neighborhoods. The relative lack of sectarian differences poses the  
                                                 
99 Interview by author with MAJ Thomas Munsey. 15 NOV 07. 
100 Interview by author with MAJ Andrew Gainey, 29 OCT 07. 
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threat of easy unification of the society under an insurgent cause and the promise of 
simplicity in composing IO talking points and PSYOP messages for the U.S. forces. Al 
Anbar shares borders with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria, which makes it much more 
susceptible to foreign influence. Al Ramadi and Fallujah are settled along a direct 
highway to Jordan and Syria and have a long history of smuggling with the neighboring 
states that has posed a threat to the growth and maintenance of indigenous police and 
security forces in Al Anbar.101 
2. Operation Al Fajr, Fallujah, Iraq: November 2004 
 The importance of the second battle of Fallujah is not simply that it was another 
high-intensity contact between the insurgent and U.S. forces; rather, the battle was a 
fusion of IO and maneuver that was developed after the first attempt to take Fallujah, 
without an IO plan, failed miserably to quell the insurgency or impose U.S./Coalition 
Forces (CF) messages throughout the region. The first battle, in fact, actually reinforced 
the frames of the insurgents and clerical leaders who had made the town ungovernable by 
the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) or CF. 
The first attempt on Fallujah began in April 2004 with a cordon of the city and 
weak attempts to coax the fledgling Iraqi security forces to attack hardened insurgent 
positions. The rapid response of the IIG/Bremer government to the execution of four U.S. 
contractors left little time to plan and little desire to attack on the part of the maneuver 
commanders who received the order to assault the city resulting in a hastily constructed 
and resourced attack called Operation Vigilant Resolve. Essentially, the task force 
assembled had had little time to plan, coordinate, or research the best way to take the 
town, minimize civilian casualties, and nullify the leadership of the clerics who were 
leading the insurgents from within the city.102 Even though the U.S./CF had clear 
military dominance against the insurgents in Fallujah during Operation Vigilant Resolve, 
the operation was a failure because “operations in the information domain were not 
                                                 
101 Carter Malkasian. Thin Blue Line in the Sand. DemocracyJournal.Org. Summer 2007. .55. 
102 LTG Thomas F. Metz et. al, “Massing Effects in the Information Domain: A Case Study in 
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integrated into the battle plan.”103 Steps to integrate IO into the battle plan would have 
included “engaging numerous and varied Iraqi leaders, removing enemy information 
centers, and rapidly disseminating information from the battlefield to worldwide 
media.”104 
The mistakes made in Operation Vigilant Resolve were avoided in the second 
battle of Fallujah, code named Operation Al Fajr (New Dawn). The operation was planed 
and coordinated under the auspices of Iraqi leadership and taken with IO in mind. The 
planners at Multi National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) created the “IO threshold” in order to 
prevent another informational defeat. The planners knew that the best way to prepare the 
battlefield was not through conventional artillery and air strikes; rather, it would be 
through gaining a dominant position on the information battlefield and nullifying the 
insurgent leadership through coercing them to leave or proving them wrong. The very 
name of the operation, Al-Fajr, was chosen because it put an Iraqi face on the assault and 
was intended to leave no doubt in the mind of the enemy that the attack had the license of 
the IIG. 
I have first-hand experience with the second battle of Fallujah as a Mechanized 
Infantry Company Fire Support Officer (FSO) and was a part of the planning and 
execution of lethal and non-lethal fires used during the battle. For example, my company 
was augmented with a Forward Air Controller (or FAC, which is a pilot trained to call in 
air-strikes from the ground) and a PSYOP loudspeaker team prepared to play harassment 
and non-intervention messages throughout the battle. Throughout our time in Fallujah, 
the company sought to fight the insurgents and provide for the civilians who had stayed. 
We provided medical aid to wounded civilians, license to come and go along the streets 
to families trying to get to their homes, and security from insurgent reprisal.  
The importance of IO was evident during the preparation for the battle. Prior to 
the attack, the IO plan was briefed down to the platoon and squad level with each unit 
knowing their part and the restrictions on their actions that were emplaced in order to win 
a victory not just over the fighters, but over the insurgency in the area. The purpose of the 
                                                 
103 LTG Thomas F. Metz et. al ,  5.  
104 Ibid.,  5. 
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attack was not to destroy the city; rather it was to remove the insurgents. Several weeks 
prior to the initial attack, leaflets had been dropped and a ‘whisper campaign’ initiated 
that warned fighters in Fallujah that the Iraqi and U.S. forces were going to attack. Many 
of the insurgents and leaders fled the impending invasion, but, more importantly for CF, 
so did many of the civilians which would vastly reduce the chances of collateral damage. 
The commander’s intent was to raise the IO threshold and gain the ‘high ground’ of 
information, not just the temporary control of the city. 
Using this intent as a guideline, MNF-I, MNC-I, and Multi-National 
Force-West (MNF-W) developed courses of action to mass effects in the 
information domain, thereby raising the IO threshold and creating 
additional ‘maneuver’ room for combat operations in Fallujah. We 
deliberately countered enemy information campaigning, planned and 
executed IO shaping operations, and executed carefully planned senior 
leader engagements, military diplomacy, and public diplomacy, and public 
diplomacy activities. As a result of these synchronized, integrated, and 
complementary actions, we were able to mass information effects and 
build a strong base of support for combat operations in advance of the 
operation.105 
3. 1st BCT-1st Armored Division (AD) in Ramadi 2006-07 
 Under the command of COL MacFarland, 1-1AD has been primarily recognized 
as the unit that helped to turn Ramadi from one of the most violent areas in Iraq into a 
success story for U.S.-Iraqi combined COIN operations. His method is surprisingly 
simple: first he regained control of the town through kinetic operations. He ordered his 
subordinate battalion commanders to break out of the Brigade and Battalion sized 
Forward Operating Bases and to create smaller, platoon sized, combat outposts 
throughout the city. Next, he enlisted the support of Iraqi forces, Army and police, and 
the support of the sheikhs to launch information operations in the area. Finally, he 
emplaced a system wherein the CF’s voice could be heard above the threats and messages 
of the insurgents and Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) forces’ voices. This system is called the 
TAVWAVE system and it is basically a sort of closed circuit radio-broadcasting system 
with a centralized broadcasting station controlled by U.S. and Iraqi security forces that 
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broadcasts to large speakers secured within each of the platoon-sized combat outposts 
and the Iraqi police stations around the city. These speakers broadcasted alerts for CF 
operations, daily news, and alerts to AQI activities within the area.106 Previously, AQI 
had held the ‘high-ground’ of information operations; they would simply talk to the 
people and inform them that the CF were conducting all the attacks in the area, causing 
all the damage to infrastructure, buildings, and civilian casualties and that AQI’s forces 
were the ones providing for the population of Ramadi.  
 Essential to the use of the TACWAVE system is the cultural repertoire that it 
intrinsically built on: namely the local custom of receiving news from mosque 
loudspeakers.107 The TACWAVE enabled CF to begin daily interaction with the 
populace and established the Iraqi police and army as legitimate authorities in the area. 
The fact that 1-1AD used local Iraqis to broadcast on the radio gave further legitimacy to 
cooperative local leaders, such as the chief of police, and by-passed the awkward 
differences in Iraqi dialect that CF interpreters used. This integration of IO uses tenants 
of the concept of framing but had to be brought about in a slow and painstaking way. The 
success of the TACWAVE system and the employment of information in Ramadi by 1-
1AD happened in spite of the Army organization; it was not brought about because of 
doctrine, training, or standard operating procedures (SOPs) inherent in the CF 
organization.108  
4. PSYOP in al Anbar: An Interview with the Company Commander 2006-
7109 
 IO officers on brigade staffs are rarely on the execution end of IO; rather, they are 
the planners and coordinators of higher level IO themes and the tactical application from 
the brigade and lower levels. U.S. Army PSYOP detachments and teams bring the IO 
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and Staffs in the use of IO and cultural awareness, conducted 31 OCT 07. 
109 Interview by author with MAJ Brian Yarbrough, Commander C Co (POB) conducted 15 NOV 07. 
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message to the battlefield and gather information on the insurgents’ themes. In this 
section an interview with MAJ Yarbrough will be broken into two sections: the duties 
and capabilities of the PSYOP detachment in al Anbar, the IO battlefield in al Anbar, and 
messaging operations. The purpose is to apply the lessons learned from Schleifer to 
actual PSYOP in Iraq. 
MAJ Yarbrough’s PSYOP company was split into three detachments, responsible 
for coordinating with U.S. Army brigades’ and Marine regimental headquarters’ 
operations. Each of these detachments consisted of three teams, which equals out to a 
total of nine teams responsible for carrying the message and analyzing the IO battlefield. 
At any one time, MAJ Yarbrough had to support up to 18-20 maneuver battalions within 
the whole of al Anbar Province. With so few teams and so many maneuver units to 
support, MAJ Yarbrough found that his assets were the most sought after and utilized 
combat multipliers in the region. His detachment was responsible for propagating and 
analyzing coalition forces’ (CF) themes and to analyze the effects of those themes, as 
well as the themes generated by the insurgents. PSYOP messages are generally long-
term, running months to years. An example of a long term message is ‘support the Iraqi 
Security Forces (ISF).’  Short term messages range from immediate appeals, e.g., 
surrender appeals, instructions to civilians on the battlefield, to month-long ISF recruiting 
messages. Much like Schleifer argued, the U.S. PSYOP teams are capable of running 
multiple TA messages based on the demographics, events and location. Within al Anbar, 
C Co ran the gamut of TAs and messages from province-wide to the more specific; which 
were the more prevalent messages. 
  PSYOP operators measure their effects and the insurgents’ message vitality on 
the battlefield through their measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of 
effectiveness (MOE).110  MOPs are essentially what the unit did versus MOEs which is a 
measurement of how well the unit did the action. For MAJ Yarbrough, the most reliable 
MOPs came from the situation reports (SITREPs) that he received from the teams in the 
field informing him of how many and what type of information products they 
disseminated. The least reliable MOPs were the opinion polls that the teams conducted 
                                                 
110  U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-13  Information Operations. 13 Feb 2006,  xv. 
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throughout al Anbar. These polls had questionable results since the surveyed population 
was small and therefore did not adequately reflect a significant percentage of the 
population. MOEs, on the other hand, were most reliable when the teams reported visible 
action/behavioral change that could be attributed to a product. MAJ Yarbrough’s example 
for an MOE spans two of his deployments. In April 2004, in support of Operation 
Vigilant Resolve (Fallujah), PSYOP teams dropped leaflets telling the TA to listen to 
radio stations, one AM, one FM, on which stations they broadcast two different 
messages, each with similar themes and the same end-state. During MAJ Yarbrough’s 
second tour, he noted an increase in reporting of anti-Iraqi forces (AIF), improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) and caches; but this MOE was less reliable because the actions 
of the TA could not be directly attributed to the radio disseminated products or the 
handbills passed out in the area of operations (AO) throughout the three years covered by 
MAJ Yarbrough’s deployment experience.  
 C Co (PSYOP) had total autonomy in message tailoring and execution within al 
Anbar due to the trust that MAJ Yarbrough was able to build with the MNC-W 
commander. This autonomy coupled with the capacity to conduct thorough TA analysis 
throughout the AO significantly improved the control of information in the region. MAJ 
Yarbrough employed many techniques from the TACWAVE system set up in Ramadi to 
leaflets handed out by tactical and PSYOP units. His opinion of the best method of IO 
engagement was simple face-to-face interaction. He is adamant that the best way to 
control the information battlefield is to be consistently out among the population, “in 
their neighborhoods, on their streets and in their markets.”111  The necessity to engage 
with the population is well known by the PSYOP teams, but these teams are simply too 
small and limited in their outreach capacity to meet the demands of the population. MAJ 
Yarbrough argues that each owner of battle-space, i.e., maneuver commander from 
Infantry squad-leader to the brigade commanders, must understand and execute in order 
for IO to be effective.  
 Current operations in al Anbar are addressing this need to remain in the public eye 
through platoon-sized combat outposts throughout Ramadi, through the expansion and 
                                                 
111 Interview by author with MAJ Yarbrough. 15 NOV 07. 
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reinforcement of the Iraqi police and expanded autonomy of the Iraqi Army, and the 
success that these operations are bringing to the region reinforced by the command 
climate under GEN Petraeus, and others, that are requiring maneuver commanders to 
engage the populace and win the information fight against the insurgency. MAJ 
Yarbrough does identify one aspect where U.S. PSYOP is consistently being defeated: 
the media arena. Even at the tactical level, the global media and the internet are proving 
to be fast-paced and highly responsive. MAJ Yarbrough admits that the internet is still an 
uncharted territory for PSYOP, but simple radio and TV platforms are also missing from 
the IO fight.   
D. CONCLUSION 
 This chapter built on the concept of framing discussed in chapters two and three 
and addressed where U.S. operations in Iraq are currently using tactics where framing 
could be applied doctrinally. Schleifer’s analysis of the IDF’s response to the Palestinian 
Intifada raised two lessons that have only been applied to U.S. operations in Iraq since 
2006: namely that, first, the populace is the true center of gravity in COIN operations. 
That means that no amount of killing insurgents will, by itself, end the insurgency. The 
most effective course of action is to engage the populace, provide security and services, 
and win the population’s consent which thereby denies the insurgents their hiding place 
and their control of information. Popular support is the first line of defense against the 
overwhelming conventional force wielded by the U.S. and CF in Iraq and it is self-
invigorating. Because the insurgents hide among the populace, the conventional forces 
must engage the populace to engage the insurgents. When this happens, Soldiers 
invariably cause friction with the locals; this friction is intensified when culture, language 
and personal interests are in complete opposition, such as they are between U.S. forces 
and Iraqi nationals. Second, an information campaign that targets audiences by their 
respective interests is the key to winning the information battlefield. Controlling the 
initiative of information is the ‘high ground’ in counterinsurgency because it denies the 
insurgents the ability to recruit new fighters, refit their equipment using community 
resources, and resupply their operations with ‘beans and bullets.’   
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 US PSYOPs in Iraq have applied the first of Schleifer’s tactical lessons in al 
Anbar through the integration of the TACWAVE system, increased face-to-face patrols, 
and support of indigenous law-enforcement agencies. The second lesson is applied only 
over time. Just as MAJ Yarbrough’s MOE was gathered over a period of three years, and 
even then it was unsure which tactic was the actual cause to the measured effect, it is the 
nature of the IO fight that the CF must remain consistent and predictable, if at the very 
least, it must remain so in policy.  
The U.S. Army has struggled to adapt to the COIN environment, but is learning 
and applying its lessons learned steadily. The advancement of doctrine and battlefield 
experience go hand-in-hand, several instruments have aided in the process, such as the 
Center for Army Lessons Learned. The nature of insurgencies is their rapid reaction and 
decentralized decision making; the nature of the U.S. Army is its centralized authority 
and decentralized execution. While the Army has proved itself conventionally, it is not 
organized to be responsive enough to the information environment of COIN operations 
and has appeared awkward and slow to learn. Much like the IDF against the Intifada, the 
U.S. Army has been more willing to commit troops to kinetic operations in Iraq, such as 
Operations Vigilant Resolve and Al Fajr, than to addressing the information battlefield. 
IO is, itself, not a decisive operation, rather, it is a supporting operation. This distinction 
is one of the reasons why maneuver commanders are so hesitant to rely on it in the COIN 
environment. Most would rather base their metrics of success on more tangible things 
such as IED attacks, insurgent caches found, U.S. equipment destroyed and personnel 
killed/wounded in combat, etc. The metrics for COIN, however, are more akin to the 
number of schools rebuilt, the number of hours of electricity provided, and the number of 
jobs/unemployed per capita in each village. Modifying the tactical attitude of maneuver 
commanders, and thereby their staffs and subordinate commanders, is the purpose of this 
thesis. Integrating the concept of framing from social mobilization theory into COIN 
doctrine directly adjusts the focus of information away from pure kinetic operations and 
towards the heart of the matter: how insurgencies gain support from the local population.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Throughout this thesis a constant refrain has been that the U.S. military has had to 
play ‘catch-up’ with the insurgency, not only in tactics, but also in doctrine. Honestly, 
what would happen if framing were not applied to U.S. Doctrine?  Does this thesis pass 
the ‘so what’ test?  Doctrine is the way that the U.S. military applies its lessons learned 
on the battlefield and incorporates those actions that are most effective in fighting and 
winning in land warfare. The thesis has shown that framing is a cogent theory and has 
been tested over time and across several different cultures, thus it passes the theory 
requirements for generalization, and has therefore been utilized academically for almost 
three decades in the analysis of revolutions, insurgencies, and social movements 
encompassing the total gamut of the use of force from violent to non-violent on the part 
of the insurgency and the regime. Furthermore, this thesis has shown that framing can be 
applied to the COIN battlefield and that it is relevant to current operations in Iraq and 
specifically relevant to IO and PSYOP. The purpose of field manuals is to provide a 
guide for Soldiers and Marines while they operate; therefore, they are not laws unto 
themselves to be strictly followed. Clearly, COIN operations surpass conventional 
operations in battlefield complexity where the nuances and meanings of otherwise trivial 
actions can cause severe repercussions to friendly forces.  If the Army and Marine Corps 
intend to guide combat leaders engaged in COIN operations, then providing these 
Soldiers and Marines with the mental wherewithal, and therefore the academic 
background, to accomplish their mission means incorporating framing in the doctrinal 
language.  
 This chapter continues the argument of the thesis by proposing changes to U.S. 
doctrine, specifically to the FM 3-24 (COIN) manual that will broaden it to incorporate 
framing. This will be accomplished in three steps: first identify and address the section of 
the FM 3-24where framing can be most easily applied. Second, propose amendments to 
the FM 3-24. Finally, a suggested list of authors to be cited in a new section labeled 
Further Reading that will guide Soldiers and Marines utilizing the manual to academic 
sources. 
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A. THE RIGHT PLACE FOR FRAMING IN THE FM 3-24 
While this thesis has discussed the IO and PSYOP manuals and their lack of 
reference to the concept of framing, it is the opinion of the author that the most effective 
way to introduce framing to the tactical fight, and therefore to the battlefield 
organizational level that will be most likely to need the concept, is to insert framing into 
the FM 3-24. Two observations support this opinion. First, the level of discussion of the 
FM 3-24 among officers of different branches of service far surpasses the knowledge of 
branch-specific manuals such as the IO and PSYOP manuals. Second, the newness of the 
FM 3-24(published Dec. 2006 under GEN Petraeus and LTG Amos, U.S.MC) makes it 
more expedient to alteration as new observations from the battlefield in Iraq and 
Afghanistan are incorporated into the military doctrine and professional writings.  
Chapter one of the FM 3-24 lays out a general opening and discussion of what an 
insurgency is, how they generally work, and what a counterinsurgency is and how it 
works. Even from this early stage in the manual, framing can be applied. Section 1-38112 
describes one of six proposed approach “mobilizing support based on the common 
identity of religious affiliation, clan, tribe, or ethnic group.”113  This identity-based 
mobilization plays on the social psychological constructs that are the basic building 
blocks to frames.114  While this section is small and is meant as a brief overview, the 
relative weight given to a previous section, ‘protracted popular war,’ delved into Mao 
Zedong’s Theory, and the Vietnamese modification called ‘Dau Tranh’ or ‘the 
struggle.’115  A similar approach to describing how leaders can play on the identity of the 
populace, their use of social ties among community leaders, and the frames that 
immediately modify actions taken on the COIN battlefield that further insight the 
                                                 
112 FM 3-24. Chicago University Press; Chicago. (2006)  14. 
113 Ibid.,  14. 
114 Hank Johnston and John Noakes. Social Movements and the Framing Perspective. Rowman and 
Littlefield; Boulder, CO. (2005),  4. 
115 FM 3-24. Chicago University Press; Chicago. (2006),  12-13. 
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populace to support the insurgents. A suitable reference to Hafez’s116  work on Muslim 
rebellion or Schleifer’s117 study of the Palestinian Intifada would round out this section.  
The FM 3-24 briefly addresses the use of cultural knowledge in the 
counterinsurgency as a basis for generating messages (CH 3), but does not use ‘framing’ 
specifically. The problem with eschewing academic terms within doctrinal texts is that it 
limits the field of study for Soldiers who have to self-train and ‘catch-up’ to the COIN 
environment wherein they find themselves. It is foolish to ignore academia and academic 
terms when one has passed from the conventional threshold, owned by the U.S. military 
since the beginning of the Cold War, and into unconventional warfare where academia 
has led in the field of study for almost forty years.  
  
 
 -Word of mouth   -Radio broadcasts 
 -Speeches by elites and key leaders -Television broadcasts 
 -Flyers and handouts   -Web sites 
 -Newspapers    -E-mail 
 -Journals or magazines  -Internet 
 -Books     -Cellular telephones 
 -Audio recordings   -Text messaging 
 -Video recordings 
 
Figure 1 Media Forms Insurgents Use118 
 
Chapter three section 3-97 of the FM 3-24 addresses insurgent information and 
media activities and identifies how the insurgency uses these media sources to gain 
popular support and to deny COIN forces entrance onto the information battlefield. The 
manual stipulates that insurgent forces’ messages need not be factual. Framing could 
easily provide this small section with more about information/framing tactics; for 
example, Wictorowicz’s studies show that social movements (e.g,. insurgencies) use de-
credentialing, credentialing, vilification and exaltation as strategies to turn the public 
opinion in their favor. Breaking insurgent messages into such clear categories streamlines 
 
                                                 
116Mohammed Hafez. Why Muslims Rebel. Lynne Reinner Publishers; Boulder, CO; (2003).  
117 Ron Schleifer. Psychological Warfare in the Intifada. Sussex Academic Press; Portland. (2006). 
118 Table 3-5, FM 3-24,  107. 
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the planning process necessary to counter these messages by COIN combat leaders. This 
leads into determining the threat’s course of action, which is addressed in chapter three, 
section 3-114.  
The importance of the information fight in COIN operations is noted throughout 
the COIN manual, but the tools to address insurgent messages and frames are glossed 
over. Table 3-7 listed under section 3-120,”Tactical Courses of Action,” generalizes the 
information fight as ‘propaganda’119 and places it near the end of a list of insurgent 
tactics that are more easily quantifiable to conventional maneuver mindsets.  
Chapter five of the FM 3-24 addresses in depth the execution of COIN operations. 
Sections 5-19 through 5-34120 address IO specifically as an integral tactic among several 
logical lines of operations (LLOs). This section argues that IO must be integrated into all 
actions and that messages and themes in support of the host nation and COIN forces must 
be centered in the local cultural dialogue. All of these lessons are part of framing; 
however, the chapter neither discusses framing nor acknowledges the academics who 
have studied these very principles for years. While the discussion within the chapter is 
clear and concise, more direction for the IO executor is necessary for his/her own 
edification. Simply listing framing as a direction for more information and study on these 
types of operations would give the IO executor a broader field of review and knowledge 
from which to generate plans and themes to counter insurgent IO. 
B. A NEW SECTION TO ACCOMPANY THE FM 3-24: FURTHER 
READING 
Good Soldiers and Marines are naturally curious creatures; they want to know 
what makes their enemies ‘tick’ and, more importantly, how to make that ticking stop. 
Providing these busy minds with knowledge is the key to preparing combat leaders for 
COIN operations. The introduction to the FM 3-24 notes the characteristics and actions of 
armed forces that effectively learned and executed COIN operations. Of the nine 
characteristics or actions it listed, four apply to this section. Successful COIN operators: 
 
                                                 
119 FM 3-24,  116. 
120 Ibid.,  160-164. 
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• “Regularly challenged their assumptions, both formal and informal. 
 
• Learned about the broader world outside the military and requested outside 
assistance in understanding foreign political, cultural, social and other situations 
beyond their experience. 
 
• Established rapid avenues of disseminating lessons learned 
 
• Proved open to soliciting and evaluating advice from the local people in the 
conflict zone.”121 
 
Most important to this section is the second bullet; however, this begs the 
question, to whom do we turn for knowledge?  Preferring one academic is as good as 
arguing against another in some cases. Thankfully, framing is a broad enough topic that a 
general listing of articles, most of which are thankfully no longer than 10 pages of 
reading, is enough to get the idea across to Soldiers and Marines concerned with the IO 
and PSYOP spectrum of operations. Why use academics?  The strongest argument is that 
they are the ones who have thought about and studied up close the phenomena of political 
warfare, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, etc. As is noted in the FM 3-24 in the Preface, 
Introduction and the Foreword, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have shelved the 
lessons they learned in Vietnam and have not bothered to study or apply these lessons in 
subsequent conflicts.  
A projected list of references that would help illuminate framing would include 
selections from Benford and Snow, Johnston, Hafez, and Schleifer that are cited in this 
thesis’ bibliography; these scholars’ works could accompany COIN related manuals so 
that Soldiers and Marines may explore the field of study and get a feel for the nuances in 
the field. The U.S. Army is well equipped, trained, and mentally prepared for 
conventional warfare and has proven itself as a supreme power in this regard, even 
against a weakened enemy such as Iraq, U.S. forces have proven their conventional 
capacity to the world. The problem is that the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have moved beyond the conventional scheme of fires and maneuver and into a peace-
keeping, stability and support, counterinsurgency operations that have been kept well 
                                                 
121 FM 3-24:Introduction. Chicago University Press; Chicago. (2006),  liii. 
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outside the doctrinal and professional dialogue since Vietnam.122 Chapter 1 of the FM 3-
24 (section 1-8) warns that the conventional prowess of U.S. forces will only ensure the 
use of irregular warfare in future enemies of the United States and its allies.123  The 
prevailing feeling among the Army and Marine officers is that the GWOT will not be the 
last time U.S. forces will be committed to a COIN environment and this feeling is only 
beginning to filter into doctrine and training. 
If the U.S. military is going to be the tool selected for COIN, then it had better get 
sharp. The U.S. military needs to get smart on COIN operations; in order to do this it 
must break the time-honored tradition of conventional thinking and start out-thinking the 
insurgency. It cannot do this without study, experience, and support. Academic sources 
provide these relatively free of bloodshed. The insertion of a suggested reading list allows 
the FM 3-24 to guide Soldiers and Marines to new information that will insure U.S. 
COIN operations will continue to be innovative and responsive to whatever battlefield 
environment service-members may find themselves in future warfare or within current 
areas of operation.  
C. CATCHING UP TO THE INSURGENCY 
In light of the doctrinal gap identified by GEN Petraeus (USA) and LTG Amos 
(USMC),124 social mobilization theory, and framing in particular, stands at the forefront 
of academic disciplines that can immediately help foster an understanding of 
counterinsurgency operations conducted by a coalition of foreign troops and fledgling 
indigenous security forces by its cogent study of mobilization that spans culture and time. 
The focus that framing places on the formation of messages, cultural repertoire, 
organization and  leadership used by insurgent organizations to rally support from the 
population can better align conventionally organized U.S. forces to attend to the true 
center of gravity in military operation within Iraq; namely the civilian population. 
                                                 
122 John A. Nagl (LTC). FM 3-24 COIN Manual“Forward to the Univ. of Chicago Press Edition.” 
University of Chicago Press; Chicago. (2007),  xiii. 
123 Ibid.,  3. 
124 David Petraeus (GEN,  U.S.A) and James Amos (LTG,  U.S.MC).FM 3-24: Foreword. University 
of Chicago Press; Chicago. (2006),  xlv. 
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Controlling the flow of information, e.g., the frames produced by the insurgency, reduces 
the effect of enemy supply chains and constricts his ability to operate. This tactic has 
been proven successful in al Anbar Province since 2006 as was discussed in Chapter IV.  
What would happen if the U.S. military doctrine did not incorporate framing into 
its COIN operations? Absolutely nothing; there would simply be a continuation of the 
current policy that ‘hopes’ a COIN-focused and capable commander, such as COL 
MacFarlane or GEN Petraeus, would assume command and find these facts for 
themselves. It is foolish to ‘hope’ for the best when there is knowledge available to help 
steer service members in the right direction. Fostering an understanding of framing and 
applying it to military doctrine concerning COIN operations is providing an academic 
background to train the Soldiers and Marines who are tasked with fighting and winning in 
a COIN environment.  
D. FURTHER STUDY 
 The following bullets are suggested topics for further research that I have come 
across in my studies:  
• Framing is simply one concept from a whole discipline under political/social 
sciences that can aid the U.S. military’s planners and executors in the COIN fight. 
More research into social mobilization theory could help military officers identify 
insurgent movements and to breach the intelligence gap that insulates these 
politically motivated groups. As the FM 3-24 states, “some of the best weapons 
for counterinsurgents do not shoot,”125 finding these weapons and using them 
quickly on the radicalized portion of the population is essential to COIN.  
 
•  Irregular warfare and guerrilla tactics utilized by insurgents have long been the 
area of expertise of the Special Forces; breaking the organizational lines of 
communication between ‘conventional’ and ‘special’ forces can only make the 
COIN operations more effective. 
 
• Developing a way to train Soldiers and Marines on IO during peace time would 
seriously shorten the learning curve in times of war. 
                                                 
125 FM 3-24, section 1-153,  49. 
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APPENDIX 
Surah 2: 190-195 
190. Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress 
limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors.  
191. And slay them wherever ye catch them, and turn them out from where 
they have Turned you out; for tumult and oppression are worse than 
slaughter; but fight them not at the Sacred Mosque, unless they (first) fight 
you there; but if they fight you, slay them. Such is the reward of those who 
suppress faith.  
192. But if they cease, Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.  
193. And fight them on until there is no more Tumult or oppression, and 
there prevail justice and faith in Allah. but if they cease, Let there be no 
hostility except to those who practise oppression.  
194. The prohibited month for the prohibited month,- and so for all things 
prohibited,- there is the law of equality. If then any one transgresses the 
prohibition against you, Transgress ye likewise against him. But fear Allah, 
and know that Allah is with those who restrain themselves.  
195. And spend of your substance in the cause of Allah, and make not your 
own hands contribute to (your) destruction; but do good; for Allah loveth 
those who do good.  








“5. But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the Pagans 
wherever ye find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for 
them in every stratagem (of war); but if they repent, and establish regular 
prayers and practice regular charity, then open the way for them: for Allah 
is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.” 
 





“60. Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, 
including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of 
Allah and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but 
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whom Allah doth know. Whatever ye shall spend in the cause of Allah, 
shall be repaid unto you, and ye shall not be treated unjustly.  
61. But if the enemy incline towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards 
peace, and trust in Allah. for He is One that heareth and knoweth (all 
things).”   
Yusuf Ali, Holy Qu’ran “Surah 8:60-1 Al-Anfal”  
http://www.harunyahya.com/Quran_translation/Quran_translation8.php. 
 
Surah 2:153-55: The promise of God’s faithfulness to those that persevere  
153. O ye who believe! seek help with patient perseverance and prayer; for Allah is with 
those who patiently persevere.  
154. And say not of those who are slain in the way of Allah. "They are dead." Nay, they 
are living, though ye perceive (it) not.  
155. Be sure we shall test you with something of fear and hunger, some loss in goods or 
lives or the fruits (of your toil), but give glad tidings to those who patiently persevere,  
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